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Abstract: In the modern era of „globalisation‟ the strategic autonomy of both firms and states 
is considered to be on the decline. Developing countries such as South Africa are considered 
to be especially susceptible the demands of highly mobile and fickle capital. The result is said 
to be a convergence on neoliberal policies, including in labour relations. However the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach has argued that the modern era of globalisation has 
seen a continuance of diversity amongst Liberal and Coordinated Market economies. This 
diversity, in turn, influences the strategies of firms that are embedded in these economies. 
Using a case study in a VoC analysis, this thesis will show that Volkswagen and Ford retain 
the industrial relations strategies of their home economies, even when operating in 
institutional environments considered to be the most conductive to convergence; Export 
Processing Zones in a developing country (in this case South Africa). The thesis thus 
illustrates the path dependency of firms in their multinational operations.  
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Introduction  
Since the 1990‟s a growing literature within comparative political economy has argued that a 
number of advanced capitalist economies can be grouped into distinct typologies, notably 
into Liberal Market Economies (LME‟s) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME‟s). This 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has rationalist institutionalist, historical 
institutionalist and sociological institutionalist strands, though overall it has agreed that the 
political economy of nations is shaped by both formal and informal institutions. The 
embeddedness and complementarities of these institutions have sustained diversity amongst 
firms and nations alike despite the alleged homogenising forces of so-called „globalisation‟. 
The VoC literature has focused a great deal on domestic institutions of states, and their 
enduring influence of firm behaviour. However, as firms grow larger and become 
multinational, and as the complexities of modern capitalism outpace the ability of 
governments to regulate, firms are exposed to a variety of foreign institutional environments 
that exist in in the international economy which can influence their behaviour.  
 
Far from being the organic product of insatiable market dominance, the international 
economy has instead been structured by powerful economic interests; such as large 
multinational corporations and powerful economies such as America. One strategy pursued 
by developing nations in this environment has been to establish Export Processing Zones 
(EPZ‟s). EPZ‟s often have business-friendly incentives and conditions, such as tax-holidays 
and concessions, and exemptions from labour and environmental regulations; however they 
often require an active state to be implemented and maintained. EPZ‟s are institutional 
constructs which are used to pursue certain strategies within defined spatial areas. This 
usually involves leveraging abundant labour supplies in order to acquire a comparative 
advantage in the export of certain manufactured products, thus attracting foreign capital. 
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Once firms from both CME and LME economies are operating in this environment, can we 
expect them to adapt to the local constraints and opportunities in a way that sees 
convergence? Once free from the institutions of their home states, do firms of all stripes 
conform to free market logic? Or will the nationality of the firms continue to influence their 
behaviours and strategies, even in this new environment?   
 
In order to establish this, the thesis will conduct a case study involving Ford and 
Volkswagen, and will compare them on their industrial relations strategies in South Africa. 
These two firms have been chosen because they are broadly similar in ownership, size, 
markets served, „transnationality‟ and workforce. Furthermore, as two of the largest 
automotive car firms in the world, they both have similar products. In other words, the 
primary difference between the two is that their nationality. Ford is an American firm, and 
pursues industrial relations strategies consistent with the LME model. Meanwhile, 
Volkswagen, as a German firm, pursues industrial relations strategies consistent with the 
CME model. Industrial relations have been chosen because (a) the CME and LME models 
differ in this area noticeably and measurably and (b) labour relations are often seen a areas in 
which firms have been forced to converge as a result of „global competition‟. 
 
Two zones used by the firms have been identified in South Africa.  South Africa is also ideal 
location for the case study because, as a developing country, it is considered to be more likely 
to encourage convergence in labour relations because of „global‟ and international pressures. 
The same is also true to EPZ‟s. Therefore, by choosing EPZ‟s in a developing country such 
as South Africa, the case study is examining the firms in an environment considered to be 
most conductive to convergence on (neoliberal) labour standards.  
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Chapter One will outline the VoC literature, and how it relates to arguments of 
„globalisation‟. This will place the thesis within a broader academic context, and further 
explore the „gap‟ to be addressed by the research. Chapter Two will outline the structure and 
design of the case study, and the methodological approach. Chapter Three will use coding of 
Ford and Volkswagen reports to show how both conform to the LME or CME models, and 
therefore what divergence in behaviour we should expect if international institutional 
environments have little effect on firm behaviour. Chapter Four will then consider what that 
institutional environment is by analysing the political economy of South Africa, and the 
conditions in its EPZ‟s. It will also argue that EPZ‟s are not „same places‟ with identical 
(neoliberal) policies, but are all institutionally unique. Finally, Chapter Five will conclude by 
analysing Ford and Volkswagen‟s actual behaviour in the these South African EPZ‟s, and 
considering how they diverge or don‟t diverge from the models establish in Chapter Three. It 
will also consider whether or not there is indeed any convergence of the two firms along a 
similar strategy, be it a „neoliberal‟ one or something else altogether.  
 
The case study will show that both Ford and Volkswagen have had to adapt their approaches 
to the labour conditions that exist in South Africa, however have overall retained their 
strategies with regard to industrial relations. The firms remain path dependant; pursuing 
similar strategies as one ones they have in place in their home nations. These strategies are 
broadly consistent with those expected using the VoC approach, that is Ford adheres to a 
LME model, while Volkswagen to a CME one.  Additionally, many of the conditions in 
South Africa have seen divergence away from more neoliberal practices, such as the 
prevalence of industry-wide bargaining. The thesis thus indicates that even in export zones in 
developing nations, so-called „global‟ pressures are not such as to cause convergence on 
industrial relations, least of all on neoliberalism.  
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Chapter One: Varieties of Capitalism and Globalisation  
 
Introduction  
 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature argues that there exist several distinctive models 
of capitalism. Each is heavily influenced and maintained by structures and institutions that 
exist within the economy and society. Firms, no matter how large, are also embedded in these 
institutions. However, it has been argued that in the era of „globalisation‟, market pressures, 
forces and imperatives are now what dictate the behaviour of firms (Strange 1996; T. 
Friedman 1999). In response to these critiques, most VoC literature has focused on the 
resilience of domestic institutions, neglecting interactions with broader, non-domestic ones. 
By examining labour-business relations in a developing nation such as South Africa, we can 
seek to establish the relative influence of these non-indigenous institutions over firm 
behaviour. This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will introduce the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature; the second will consider that literature in light of so-called 
„globalisation‟ and will make the argument for continued divergence amongst nations; and 
the third will consider the political foundations for neoliberalism in the international 
economy, and the impact on developing nations. This chapter will thus introduce the major 
ideas and literature surrounding the research.  
 
Varieties of Capitalism 
 
In recent years a body of work known as Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) has emerged from 
comparative political economy literature to dispute universalistic views of capitalism. It 
instead argues for diverse „types‟ of capitalist systems.  Whereas rational-choice economic 
Madison Cartwright                                                                                                                       Page 9 of 90 
 
liberalism expects all firms, by virtue of their „rationality‟, to converge on decisions that 
“maximise material profits and power”, an institutional approach stresses the “contextual or 
historically constructed nature of rationality” (Mikler 2007: 72).  Historical institutionalism is 
one of the most common approaches for VoC and comparative political economy scholars. It 
emphasises the importance of state and national boundaries for the production, stability and 
reproduction of institutions, resulting in “entrenched and path-dependent differentiation” 
across national borders (Djelic 2010: 25). Crucially, it argues that “[n]ational institutional 
environments are historical constructs, the crystallized sediments of a past national history. 
They generate deep rooted systemic and behavioural inertia” (Djelic 2010: 25). The 
institutions which determine the political economy of different nations are therefore the result 
of past political struggles (Thelen 2010: 54).  
 
This neoinstitutionalist approach of VoC draws heavily on the works of Karl Polanyi.  
Polanyi argued that “[t]here was nothing natural about laissez-fair; free markets could never 
have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course” (1944: 145). In other 
words, markets were (and continue to be) socially constructed. Because markets are based on 
socially and historically specific structures, they can therefore take a variety of forms. 
However, how many forms is subject to much debate. The most recognised typology is that 
of Hall and Soskice (2001), and separates advanced capitalist national economies into either 
Liberalised Market Economies (LME‟s) or Coordinated Market Economies (CME‟s).  
 
This approach takes a relational view of the firm, emphasising both the internal and external 
relationships and institutions that determine how firms coordinate their activities (Hall and 
Soskice 2001: 25-26). For example, LME‟s coordinate through hierarchies and market 
mechanisms, while CME‟s coordinate more through non-market relationships (Hall and 
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Soskice 2001: 27-28). This typology is based on rational choice institutionalism which argues 
that institutions are created by political actors in order to establish processes of incentives and 
disincentives that are able to solve coordination problems. Individuals and other rational 
political agents exist within these institutions, and use them to maximise their utility. These 
institutions will thus exist only as long as they serve the interests of these utility-seeking 
actors (Djelic 2010: 25; Lowndes 2002: 95-96). Consequently, actors will have an interest in 
preserving these institutions, and any others which reinforce or „complement‟ them (Hall 
2010: 213). The United States and Germany are seen as the ideal LME and CME models, 
respectfully.   
 
Iankova (2005: 2) has identified a similar typology using the work of Albert, which is based 
on the role of government and the prevalence of social safety nets. This produces „American 
Neo-liberal‟, „European Corporatist‟ and „Asian Statism‟ models (Iankova 2005: 1). The 
state-led Asian model has also been identified by Linda Weiss (2010: 184) who has labelled 
them (fitting with Hall and Soskice‟s vernacular) „Governed Market Economies, or GME‟s. 
In the Corporatist model, consensus, long-term economic objectives, and close coordination 
between the government and interest groups are both desirable and necessary (Iankova 2005: 
4-5). This is in stark contrast to the American model, which, “favours individualism, rational 
self-interests, the primacy of personal rights over equality, a minimal state role in the 
economy, and marginalisation of labour by powerful businesses.” (Iankova 2005: 2). 
Therefore, despite its more state-centric approach, the American Neo-liberal and the 
European Corporatist models closely resemble the LME‟s and CME‟s of Hall and Soskice. 
However, the emphasis on the role of government has differentiated Asian Statist economies 
such as Japan from the European Corporatist economies such as Germany. Such economies 
have highly concentrated firms which are closely integrated with the state (Iankova 2005: 3-
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4). South Korea‟s chaebols, and Japan‟s keiretsus are ideal examples. Other scholars, such as 
Mann (1997) and Kang (2010), have also noted that the East Asian political economy differs 
from the American and European in its extensive coordination between the state and private 
corporations. 
 
Another typology is that of Epsing-Andersen (1990), which emphasises social structures, 
concentrating on the varieties of welfare states across the major capitalist economies. Epsing-
Andersen identifies three „types‟ of welfare capitalism: the liberal welfare state, the 
corporatist welfare state, and the social democratic welfare state.  The liberal welfare state 
provides means-tested safety nets designed for the most disadvantaged citizens. Such welfare 
states include America, Canada and Australia. Meanwhile, the corporatist welfare state 
considers benefits and transfers less as a stigma and more as a social right. However, 
redistribution is negligible, as the system is more strongly geared toward sustaining existing 
class differences rather than alleviating them. Examples of corporatist welfare states include 
Germany, Italy and France. Finally, the social democratic welfare state is essentially a 
combination of socialism and liberalism. It is more universal, and is based on egalitarianism, 
solidarity and full-employment. Examples include most of the Scandinavian counties 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 25-30). This typology applies normative institutionalism, which 
argues that institutions influence the “values, norms, interest, identities and beliefs” (March 
and Olsen, quoted in Lowndes 2002: 95) of actors.  
 
Other approaches to VoC have even more extensive typologies. These include an approach 
by Whitley, who established „business systems‟ that are shaped by capital and industrial 
structures (1999). Whitley starts with three types of owner control: Direct control by owners, 
Alliance between fairly autonomous managers and owners, and Market portfolio control 
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(1999: 31-35). From these he incorporates levels of coordination and vertical/horizontal 
integration to establish five business systems: Fragmented, Coordinated Industrial Districts, 
Compartmentalised, State-Organised, Collaborative, and Highly Coordinated (1999: 43-44). 
Work systems are similarly divided into Taylorist, Delegated Responsibility (Negotiated and 
Paternalist), and Flexible Specialisation (Artisanal and Patriarchal) (1999: 92-93). These 
work systems are determined by the prevailing industrial training systems, and the level to 
which interest groups are institutionalised in society and the economy(1999: 100-03; 2010: 
146-47). Another approach is that of Bruno Amable, which starts with five key institutions: 
product-market competition, wage-labour nexus and employment market institutions, the 
financial intermediation sector and corporate governance, social protection and Welfare State, 
and the education sector (2003: 14). From these he establishes five „types‟: market-based, 
social democratic, Continental European, Mediterranean, and Asian (2003: 15-16).  
 
It is important to note that this thesis will not be seeking to establish which typology of 
variety is better and why; it is instead an attempt to establish whether such variety exists with 
regard to the business-labour relations of an American (Ford) and German (Volkswagen) firm 
in export zones in South Africa (SA). This fact also means that the methodological approach 
of the thesis will be firm-centred. As such, Hall and Soskice‟s LME and CME approach will 
be adopted.   
 
However, Hall and Soskice‟s approach has been criticised for creating a binary typology 
leading to a false dichotomy (Amable 2003: 79-80). Nations are placed in one of the above 
typologies, obscuring the extent to which they can, and often do, embody various components 
of both, in different ways (Crouch 2005a: 440).  For example, Crouch argues that the intimate 
relationship between business and government in America‟s defence sector is uncharacteristic 
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of the LME model (Crouch 2005a: 442; Crouch 2005b: 122); as too is America‟s extensive 
industrial policy measures (Block 2008). In other words, by defining America as an LME and 
focusing on difference, any similarities it has with other „types‟ are marginalised (M. Watson 
2003: 227-31). Additionally, the approach is susceptible to falling into a more straight-
forward orthodox economic analysis, ranking economies as  more and less laissez-fair along a 
continuum (Peck and Theodore 2007: 751). In doing so they create a purely free market 
model that exists external of social processes, thus providing an „other‟ by which to contrast 
their approach (Crouch 2005b: 124). The following research has been conducted with these 
criticisms in mind.  
 
Globalisation and Varieties of Capitalism   
 
The VoC perspective is strongly contested by liberal and Marxist scholars, who both argue 
that the market imperatives and competitive pressures of globalisation will marginalise some 
firms while favouring others, homogenising firm behaviour along profit maximising lines
1
 
(Hodgson 1995). For Marxists, the needs of capital to expand and find new markets will 
inevitably result in convergence (Hanke 2009: 6; Marx and Engels 1848: 21-23). In this 
context, the neoliberalising pressures of „globalisation‟ since the 1970‟s represent a 
movement towards capital interests (Hanke 2009: 6-7). Scholars have both lamented and 
applauded the „retreat of the nation state‟ (Strange 1996), and the „golden straightjacket‟ 
restrictions on autonomous economic policy making (T. Friedman 1999). Although there is 
much disagreement as to whether this is a positive development or not, scholars of both the 
                                                             
1 Scholars from a variety of traditions, including Islamic (Dusuki and Abdullah 2007),  Marxists (Enoch 2007;  
Foster 2001; Fridell 2007) and neoliberal (M. Friedman 1970) have all argued that firms are driven by the 
universal necessity of profit maximisation to converge on behaviour which disregards all „social‟ concerns. 
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left and the right agree that the world is currently at a stage of „hyper globalisation‟, in which 
markets are becoming dominant (Martell 2007: 174). In short, VoC is no longer seen as 
viable in a globalised world.  
 
It is important to note that the above „hyper-globalisation‟ argument has been severely 
weakened since the 1990‟s. Firstly, several scholars have noted that current levels of so-
called „globalisation‟ (such as the share of exports and FDI of GDP), are only marginally 
larger today than the era preceding the Great Depression (Weiss 1997: 7; Whitley 1998: 459). 
Secondly, it has also been argued that globalisation has been a rhetorical tool, rather than a 
driver, in implementing more liberalised policies (Conley 2004; Hall and Biersteker 2002: 6; 
Sassen 2002: 105; Weiss 1997: 16). Thirdly, the „transnationality‟ of so-called Transnational 
Corporations (TNC‟s) is exaggerated (Dicken 2007: 124-26), and many TNC‟s remain 
geographically embedded in their home nations, and are largely dependent on the state 
(Dicken 2007: 126-32; Fulcher 2000: 531; Weiss 1997: 10; Whitley 1998: 461).  Fourthly, 
the notion that states are severely restricted by global markets in certain policy areas, 
specifically fiscal and monetary policy, is empirically unsupported, at least for advanced 
economies (Weiss 2010: 190-91). The inexorable forces of globalisation thus appear to be 
more myth than reality, and therefore the threat that they supposedly pose to continued 
variety amongst capitalist nations are either greatly exaggerated, or negligible.   
 
VoC proponents provide other important rebuttals against convergence theories (Amable 
2003: 23-24; Hanke 2009: 4). According to Hall and Soskice (2001: 64-66), unique 
institutional environments will mean that different nations and firms will respond to 
globalisation in different ways. In fact, governments and firms will attempt to leverage the 
existing institutions that grant them their current comparative advantages, further entrenching 
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the differences between the two systems and creating new forms of diversity (Crouch 2005a: 
447; Peck and Theodore 2007: 747). Institutional complementarities further support this 
resilience to „global‟ pressures as economic actors seek to preserve certain institutions that 
reinforce, and are in turn reinforced by, others institutions in the economy (Djelic 2010: 27; 
Kang 2010: 524-25). The result is that each variety of capitalism has adapted to the 
challenges of globalisation successfully, without sacrificing their idiosyncrasies (Dore 2000: 
531; Fulcher 2000; Weiss 1997: 15). This has been more the case for nations with strong 
institutional complementarities, such as Japan, than for those with wreaker ones, such as 
South Korea (Kang 2010). 
 
However, the imperatives of international competition, the increasing emphasis on 
profitability, the rising influence of equity capital, and the need for entrepreneurial creativity 
have put significant pressure on CME‟s to surrender their generous social security systems 
(and the large taxes that sustain them) and inject „flexibility‟ into their labour markets (Albert 
1997). Social Democratic parties in Sweden and Germany did indeed enact neoliberal 
reforms throughout the 1990‟s and 2000‟s (Lavelle 2007: 122-26), and similar movements 
have been underway in Japan (Dore 2000: 112-13; Kume and Thelen 2006: 28-34). 
Previously statist economies such as France and South Korea have made notable movements 
towards neoliberal policies in many key area‟s (Kang 2010: 520), however as Weiss has 
noted, it is important to not equate a tendency with a whole scale transition (Weiss 2010: 
189).  
 
For example, Thelen has argued that while CME‟s have been attempting to increase the 
flexibility of their labour markets, they have done so through „controlled decentralisation‟, 
and not drastic deregulation (2001: 78-79). In Germany, employers have shown a preference 
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to reform the existing system, rather than dismantling it entirely (Thelen 2001, 84-88). 
Furthermore, while CME‟s have recently undergone significant reforms in industrial 
relations, they have not been along a single (neoliberal) trajectory in which homogenised 
business interest have been squared against homogenised labour interest. Instead, the reforms 
have occurred within existing networks and structures, in which unions and firms have 
perused their own independent interests (Kume and Thelen 2006). Overall, convergence has 
often been overstated. In Japan, policy changes have not yielded significant and wide-spread  
practical changes (Dore 2000: 114-15; Kume and Thelen 2006: 28-34), and liberal ideas 
struggle to gain “control over the ideological airspace” (Dore 2000, 115). Many of the elite in 
Japan continue to consider their developmental model as historically „normal‟, vindicated by 
their experiences with it (Y. W. Lee 2008: 522-24). It thus appears that path dependency has 
sustained core domestic policy preferences in the face of so-called „globalisation‟; despite 
some more minor, less structural reforms. Furthermore, firms remain embedded within these 
environments.  
 
Globalisation as a Political Project 
 
However, in addition to being culturally and institutionally embedded (Djelic 2010: 31), the 
agency of firms also exists within multiple institutional settings; meaning that discretion is 
also needed (Bell 2010: 9). Actors, especially multinational corporations (MNC‟s) like Ford 
and Volkswagen, often move “across multiple kinds of boundaries and cross over many 
different institutional spheres” (Djelic 2010: 32). This is what has led Sassen  (2002) to argue 
against the common view of globalisation that considers the realm of the national and the 
realm of the global as mutually exclusive. According to Colin Crouch (2005b: 127), the 
contexts in which actors operate may themselves be set within wider ones. So while it is true 
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that MNC‟s may retain their national and regional identities (Mikler 2010: 410), it would be 
unsatisfactory to ignore the ability of the „different institutional spheres‟ to alter their 
discretionary behaviour. In short, institutional layers and diverse institutional „spheres‟ will 
have „gaps‟ that actors such as MNC‟s can exploit and leverage in order to achieve their own 
goals (Thelen 2010: 54-55). Therefore, the constraints and opportunities of the „global‟ 
economy can empower firms such Ford and Volkswagen to alter their strategies. 
 
However, if the „global‟ economy is not a case of market triumphalism, then what is it? The 
following will argue that „globalisation‟ is best described as a political project in which a 
global economic order is built and sustained by powerful nations and their interests. This 
conception is similar to the „hegemonic stability hypothesis‟, which postulates that any 
international liberal economic order requires a hegemonic nation to sustain it by providing 
the public goods that facilitate economic trade, finance and cooperation; often at the 
economic cost to the hegemon (Gilpin 2001: 93-97). However, the hegemons willingness and 
desire to sustain such „stability‟ largely depends on political considerations rather than 
economic considerations. Furthermore, the „goods‟ it produces cannot be considered „public‟ 
because the order that the hegemon sustains is subsystemic, meaning that it is not universal 
and effectively excludes some nations (Stein 1999: 287). For example, economic integration 
and liberalisation in Europe suited America‟s post-WWII ambitions to contain the Soviet 
Union while strengthening its own influence (Clark 1997: 130). America thus established a 
subsystemic international economic order which served its political interest by marginalising 
the Soviet Bloc and revitalising the war beaten economies of its major European allies  (Stein 
1999: 295-308). The „global economy‟ is therefore a product of political processes that are 
guided by the distribution of power amongst nations and other actors. 
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Liberal globalisation can therefore been seen as a calculated political agenda, stemming from 
economic nationalism. While economic nationalism has erroneously been equated with 
mercantilism in the past, Helleiner (2002: 312-22) has argued that we must expand its 
definition, and instead understand it as an ideology that states that economic policies should 
serve to strengthen and empower the nation; whether they be mercantilist policies or liberal. 
Generally, once a country becomes economically and politically dominant, it is often 
favourable for it to pursue more liberal policies and „freer trade‟(Gilpin 1984: 295). It was the 
leadership of America that created the post-WWII economic order which is managed and 
sustained by embedded liberal institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Gilpin 2001: 83). In 
addition it its leadership role, the American hegemon is also the main beneficiary of 
liberalisation, specifically financial liberalisation, in this global economic order (Helleiner 
1995). It is therefore apparent that the hegemon of the day, whoever it may be, has the most 
influence in the establishment of the international economic order.  
 
However, as Arthur Stein (1999: 294-95) has noted, it is impossible for the hegemon to act as 
a leader if it has no followers. In order to secure cooperation from other powers, the hegemon 
must make some concessions, and cannot simply dictate terms. Global economic relations 
thus reflect the prevailing balance of political power, along with any asymmetries (Gilpin 
1984: 295). Indeed, in 2010 the G20 agreed to reallocate 6% of the voting rights to under-
represented countries, specifically China, which now holds the third largest quota (Taylor 
25/10/2010). This is an example of international economic institutions catering to shifts in the 
international political economy. Nevertheless, we continue to live in a “US-led neoliberal 
international order” that has “attempted to homogenize the shape of the political economies 
of the world to an unprecedented degree” (Y. W. Lee 2008: 507). Lee (2008) has also argued 
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that Japan is the only advanced economy in the post-Cold War age to pose a significant 
challenge to this homogenisation. Meanwhile, developing countries such as South Africa, 
lacking political and economic power, are marginalised in this process. 
 
For example, Chang (2003) has noted that almost all advanced economies, including 
America, developed with the help of import substitution, protection, and extensive state 
involvement. Moreover, having reached economic development, these advanced economies 
are now seeking to prohibit the developing world from doing the same, or „kicking away the 
ladder‟. Wade (2003) has also noted how the founding agreements of the WTO have closed 
off several avenues for development which were used by the economies of the North. In this 
way the WTO, along with other international economic institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, have imposed neoliberal policies at the behest of the national governments and 
economies that dominate them, particularly America (Fulcher 2000: 530; Mann 1997: 480-
81; H. Watson 2004: 53). America has applied its neoliberal ideology through the above 
institutions to free capital from territorial confines, with the ultimate goal of benefitting 
American corporations (H. Watson 2004: 44, 52). Consequently, „globalisation‟ is in fact the 
“by-product of states promoting the internationalization strategies of their corporations, and 
sometimes in the process „internationalizing‟ state capacity” (Weiss 1997: 4).  The upshot is 
that, while homogenising pressures of the global market have been exaggerated, less 
powerful nations such as South Africa have nevertheless been subject to pressures to 
neoliberalise due to political constraints and influences imposed on them by powerful states, 
actors and institutions.  
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Conclusion  
 
As most VoC literature on globalisation focuses on the resilience of domestic institutions, and 
neglects the influence of international institutions, there exists a gap in the literature that can 
be addressed by this thesis. Using the case study of Volkswagen and Ford‟s labour relations 
in South African export zones, it will argue that firms continue to be heavily influenced by 
their national identities even when operating in completely foreign environments. Both Ford 
and Volkswagen remain path dependant on modes of behaviour that have been structured 
according to institutions within the American (LME) and German (CME) economies. 
However, it will also illustrate that local institutional environments matter too, and that both 
firms have had to adapt to local settings. These local settings have been somewhat influenced 
by the political neoliberalisation pressures of the international economy, however also reflect 
a level of policy autonomy on behalf of the South African people and their government.  
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Chapter Two: Approach and Methodology  
 
Introduction 
 
From the literature review in Chapter One we can see that arguments of an insatiable market-
driven globalising process have been greatly exaggerated, and that domestic institutions, 
formal and otherwise, continue to play important roles in the economy and in the broader 
society. Furthermore, firms remain geographically embedded entities that are becoming more 
multinational in their operations, rather than transnational or global (Mikler 2011). However, 
as firms expand their operations internationally, they are exposed to “geographically and 
institutionally diverse environments”, which significantly weakens their ability to develop 
“distinctive innovative strategies” (Whitley 1998: 464). In other words, as firms operate 
outside of their home nations, they become influenced by a larger variety of institutional 
structures. This thesis is seeking to determine whether institutions, path dependency and 
identity follow firms abroad, or whether, once free from the direct influence of their home 
states, firms converge along utility-maximising grounds. This chapter will outline how this 
will be achieved. Firstly, it will outline the case study by illustrating the rationale for its 
structure. Secondly, it will compare Ford and Volkswagen on a number of key indicators in 
order to illustrate that the firms are suitable for comparison, and that the notable difference 
between the two firms is their nationality. This chapter will thus outline the methodology and 
strategy of the research conducted.  
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The Case Study 
 
Case studies are useful because they enable us to examine processes and relationships within 
a particular setting (Denscombe 2010: 55). Given the limited scope permitted by a thesis of 
this size, only two firms have been selected, and these will act as representative/typical firms 
of each respective typology. The representative firms chosen for analysis are Ford (LME) and 
Volkswagen (CME). Both will be compared on labour relations. This is because (a) the CME 
and LME models are said to differ significantly on labour relations, (b) this is often attributed 
a number of domestic institutions (c) liberalising labour markets is seen as an imperative 
under globalisation, and (d) homogenous labour-business relations is expected under both 
Marxist and liberal perspectives. EPZ‟s have been chosen because they are often 
characterised by their lack of regulation and oversight, thus enabling us to ask: when 
corporations are able to do anything they want, what do they do? Additionally, EPZ‟s usually 
specialise in the production of one or several goods and they are geographically concentrated 
(Ge 1999: 1268; Mittelman 2000: 157), minimising the variables and simplify comparison. 
 
South Africa was chosen because it is a developing country that host both Ford and 
Volkswagen. It also has a number of export zones, two which are utilised by the firms, 
although in different ways. Importantly, two of the zones in question are located within less 
than 30 km of each other. Furthermore, as a developing nation, South Africa is under intense 
pressure to pursue neoliberal policies and to have „race to the bottom‟ labour relations. While 
the thesis will go on to dispute these assumptions, especially the latter, it has intentionally 
chosen a developing country such as South Africa precisely because it is considered to be 
more likely to encourage convergence in these areas. There are also more practical benefits 
for choosing South Africa. Firstly, it is democratic, meaning that information from the 
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government and news sources is more reliable and accessible. Secondly, it includes English 
amongst its official languages.  
 
The case study will have three main analysis chapters. The first, Chapter Three, will consider 
how each firm defines and perceives its relationship with labour. Using content analysis and 
coding of selected documents it will argue that Ford and Volkswagen clearly exhibit different 
attitudes to human resources and industrial relations. It will compare the two firms using 
models of CME and LME labour relations to be constructed using VoC literature. The coding 
will be of selected parts of the Annual Reports and each firm‟s Code of Conduct, and will 
follow a schedule to be determined by VoC literature.  Both firms will also be compared on 
the training and employee programs that they administer and provide for their staff. 
Information on this will be accessed from publically available documents.  
 
Second, the case study will examine the company‟s labour relations in two South African 
export zones; the Coega Industrial Development Zone (used by Ford), and the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Logistics Park (used by Volkswagen). Using government documents from the 
South African Departments of Trade and Industry, together with the websites of the zones run 
by their administrator, the Coega Development Corporation, and news paper articles and 
other online resources, Chapter Four will place the EPZ‟s under analysis within a the broader 
literary context, via a literary survey. It will also determine the political economy of South 
Africa using secondary, academic sources.  
 
Chapter Five will compare the two firms and their behaviour in the South African EPZ‟s. 
Their behaviour will be measured against the same industrial relations models established in 
Chapter Three. Information on the key indicators will be sourced from newspaper articles; 
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unions, specifically NUMSA; documents from the industry level employers association, the 
Automobile Manufacturers Employers Organisation; and company documents. The data will 
then be compared with the labour relations models constructed in Chapter Three.    
 
Ford and Volkswagen  
 
Because of the unique situations that face many firms, there are a variety of different reasons 
why their behaviour might diverge. For example, some products require skilled labour in the 
production process; some products place more importance quality control comparative to 
transport costs; some products need quick delivery, others don‟t; some firms may value face-
face interactions; some industries compete on quality not cost; some assembly lines need to 
be more integrated than others; and some products require low labour turnover and higher 
productivity rather than simply lower labour costs (Cox 1997: 119-26). In other words, there 
are many variables that can account for divergent behaviour other than nationality. In order 
to eliminate these variables, the firms chosen (Ford and Volkswagen) are from the same 
industry, service a similar international market with comparable products, and are of a similar 
size and ownership type. This is important to illustrate as both firms are to be considered as 
representatives of a broader class of firms. The analysis that follows will show that the only 
significant difference between the two firms for the purpose of this analysis is their 
nationality.  
 
Firstly, both Ford and Volkswagen are amongst the most „transnational‟ firms in the world, 
ranking 53
rd
 and 71
st
 in the 2008 TNI
2
 calculations by the Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Furthermore, of the 18 American companies, and the 13 Germany companies 
                                                             
2 The TNI, or Transnationality Index, a weighted average of foreign sales as a percentage of total sales, foreign 
assets as a percentage of total assets, and foreign employment as a percentage of total employment 
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listed in the top 100, Ford ranked 11
th
 and Volkswagen ranked 4
th
, respectfully (UNCTAD 
2010). According to globalisation proponents, high levels of „transnationality‟ will make the 
firms less likely to be continuously affected by home institutions. This makes them ideal 
subjects for a case study seeking to underscore the resilience of these home institutions  
(Mikler 2007: 76). The high TNI of both firms will also moot any argument that the firms are 
insufficiently „global‟ to be subject to convergence pressures, and therefore are inappropriate 
for the case study.  
 
Secondly, according to the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles 
(OICA 2010), in 2009 Volkswagen and Ford ranked 3
rd
 and 4
th
 respectfully, in terms of units 
produced. Volkswagen was the largest car manufacturer based in Europe, while Ford was the 
second largest in America, after General Motors. In 2010 Ford sold 5,524,000 vehicles, hired 
164,000 employees, amassed $119,280,000,000 in revenue and had total assets valuing 
$165,793,000,000 (Ford 2010). In the same year, Volkswagen sold 7,278,440 vehicles, hired 
399,381 employees, amassed €126,875,000,000 in revenue and had total assets valuing 
€199,393,000,000 (Volkswagen 2010b). It is clear that Ford is slightly smaller than 
Volkswagen, however despite this slight disparity, both Ford and Volkswagen are 
comparable in size. This means that it cannot be argued that the difference found between the 
two firms was a result of their comparative sizes. Both Ford and Volkswagen are also public 
corporations listed on the stock exchange. 
 
Thirdly, despite the fact that the German market only represents 14.27% of Volkswagens 
sales, it accounts for 29% of its production, and 42% of its total workforce. Regionally, 
71.3% of Volkswagen‟s employees were located in Europe in 2010. Meanwhile, 70% of 
Volkswagen‟s production employees were located in developed nations, while the remaining 
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30% were in developing nations (as defined by the IMF)(Volkswagen 2011b). In 2010, Ford 
employed 27.7% of production workforce in the US, and 37.2% regionally in North America. 
It sources 60% of its production workforce from developed nations and 40% from developing 
nations (Ford 2011c). Workforce is the area in which the two firms find the least 
commonality, however itself cannot account for the differing behaviours found in the case 
study.   
 
Finally, Volkswagen derives 14.27% of its total sales (in units) from the German market, 
with a further 31.52% if its sales coming from the broader European market (Volkswagen 
2010b). Meanwhile Ford derives 35.04% of its sales (in units) from the American market, 
with a further 8.64% coming from regional North America (Ford 2010). Ford depends on the 
American market more because it is much larger in size than Germany‟s. When we compared 
regional sales, that is, all European (including German) sales for Volkswagen, and all North 
American (including American sales) for Ford, each derives 45.79% and 43.68% of total 
sales from their home regions, respectfully. Both therefore generate just under half of their 
total sales from their immediate regional markets. This shows that (a) both firms are 
considerably anchored in their local environments, meaning that they are ideal representatives 
for European and American capitalism, and (b) this is the case, despite them both being 
amongst the most „transnational‟ in the world. Rather than indicating that the TNI has 
inaccurately represented the „transnationality‟ of each firm, this instead indicates that even 
the most so-called transnational firms are, in fact, not that transnational at all.  
 
The above illustrates that Ford and Volkswagen are similar enough to use in the case study. 
Despite some differences, which is to be expected, both are broadly comparable on several 
key indicators. Furthermore, America and Germany are often considered the quintessential 
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LME‟s and CME‟s respectfully, and are consistently considered different „types‟ of 
capitalism under all of the typologies mentioned in Chapter One. This thus narrows the key 
variable between the firms to their nationality.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The case study will be comparing Ford and Volkswagen on their labour-business relations in 
both EPZ and their domestic economies. This chapter has illustrated that both these firms are 
comparable, and that Ford and Volkswagen are similar enough for the case study to be able to 
focus on their nationality as the key variable under analysis. The EPZ‟s chosen are located 
near the South African town of Uitenhage. Both are in close proximity to one another, and 
both are used by one of the firms. This makes them ideal candidates for the case study. The 
case study is thus structured so that any difference between the behaviour of the two firms in 
their international operations would, at the most, indicate that there is validity to 
institutionalist arguments that maintain that nationality is crucial in shaping form behaviour, 
or, at the least, indicate that large MNC‟s need not converge on rationally determined 
outcomes.  
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Chapter Three: Ford and Volkswagen and Labour Relations Under 
Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Introduction  
 
Ford and Volkswagen have been chosen as representative firms for the purpose of a case 
study that will compare the two firms on their labour relations within South African zones. In 
order to be considered appropriate candidates for such analysis, it is important to show that 
both firms adequately reflect the differing industrial relation systems of the CME and LME 
models. It is also important to determine the domestic labour relations of each respective 
firm. This is because in order to illustrate whether or not firms alter their behaviour in 
international settings, one must first determine what their national behaviour is. The chapter 
will begin by examining the LME and CME labour relation models, and the ways in which 
they differ. It will then consider the results of a coding analysis conducted on two corporate-
made documents relating to labour relations from each firm. The results of the coding will 
then be examined for key differences exhibited by each firm, before being compared to the 
models established in the first section, in order to determine whether or not Volkswagen and 
Ford are suitable representatives. Finally, it will briefly consider several processes and 
programs of the firms, and how these compare to both the attitudes exhibited in the coding, 
and the CME and LME labour models. The chapter will therefore generate results that can 
later be compared with other analyses in order to determine the impact on international 
operations of the two firms.  
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Labour Relations and Varieties of Capitalism 
 
In CME‟s, labour and business have a cooperative relationship, where negotiations and 
coordination occur on a highly formal level between large business organisations, unions and 
the state. Through these negotiations, labour exchanges wage restraint and loyalty for job 
security, education and training (Peck and Theodore 2007: 734). Meanwhile, the state 
provides a more generous „social  wage‟ through the provision of government welfare, 
pensions, health care, and other policies advocated by unions (Wilson 1990: 115). In 
Germany, training programs are run by unions and employers; union representatives sit on 
the supervisory boards for large corporations; industry-wide bargaining is still the norm, 
usually led by the large IG Metall union (the metalworkers union); and firms must adhere to 
employee-friendly stakeholder requirements established under domestic law (Dore 2000: 
117; Preston 2005: 89; Thelen 2001: 82-84; Wilson 1990: 88,97).  These laws are called 
„Codetermination’ laws, and lay the foundations for the German industrial relations system. 
They emphasise open dialogue and cooperation between management and labour (Lawrence 
2000: 125). This more closely resembles a „monitoring‟ system of corporate governance, 
which emphasises the corporation as an institution, rendering shareholder interests as only 
one of several objectives, existing amongst more social concerns (Preston 2005: 89-91) 
 
In LME‟s the labour market is more favourable towards individually negotiated contracts, 
internal competition, and market forces (Iankova 2005: 2; Peck and Theodore 2007: 734; K.  
Thelen 2001: 72).  This perhaps explains the deep mistrust and suspicion of „special interests‟ 
groups in the American political system (Wilson 1990: 119). In America, union influence has 
been declining, and unions tend to avoid wide social democratic political involvement in 
favour of „bread and butter unionism‟, which by and large accepts the asymmetric power 
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relations of capitalism (Herod 1997: 172-73; Thelen 2001: 92; Wilson 1990: 41-42). The 
legislative attack on unions has accelerated in the wake of the global financial crisis in 
American states including Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey and Wisconsin (Dennis and Fletcher 
23/02/2011). In LME‟s more broadly, managers have high levels of separation from their 
workers, and commitment to job security is low (Whitley 1999: 92). Flexible labour markets, 
high levels of mobility and a minimal welfare state (and thus less taxes) are considered vital 
to increase incentives to find, keep and excel at work (Iankova 2005: 2-3). Because of the 
lack of high level coordination, firms will attempt to achieve industrial peace through strong 
internal controls over workers (Thelen 2001: 78). Therefore, in LME‟s market forces are 
emphasised and codetermination is not considered a priority for either labour or business. 
This more closely resembles the „market‟ system of corporate governance, where 
corporations are vulnerable to stock market fluctuations and investor sentiment, making 
shareholder interests the primary objective (Preston 2005: 87-89).  
  
Madison Cartwright                                                                                                                       Page 31 of 90 
 
Table 3.1 The CME and LME Industrial Relations Models  
 CME Model LME Model 
Business-Labour 
Relations 
Cooperative Relations With 
Labour 
Adversarial Relations With 
Labour 
Negotiations Favours National or Industry-
wide Collective Bargaining  
Favours Individually Negotiated 
Contracts 
Unions and Employer 
Groups 
Industrial Relations Governed 
by Unions, Businesses and 
the State. 
Industrial Relations Left to 
Market Forces and the Influence 
of Unions etc. is Actively 
Suppressed.  
Shareholder Versus 
Stakeholder Value 
Shareholder Value one of 
Many Concerns; Other 
Stakeholders (Customers, 
Employees, the Community) 
are also Important 
Shareholder Value Primary 
Concern; Other Stakeholders are 
Secondary 
Job Security High Commitment to Job 
Security 
Low Commitment to Job 
Security  
Productivity Emphasis on Training and 
Education for Achieving 
Productivity   
Emphasis on Cost Minimisation 
and Flexibility for Achieving 
Productivity 
Hierarchy Worker Autonomy Stressed Managerial Control Stressed 
Welfare State The Welfare State is Required 
to Support the „Losers‟ of 
Capitalism 
The Welfare State Inhibits 
Effective Functioning of the 
Market and Perverts Incentives 
Sources: Thelen (2001), Whitley (1999), Dore (2000), Wilson (1990) and Iankova (2005). 
For similar summaries see Mikler (2009) and Peck and Theodore (2007). 
 
While the thesis is hesitant to make wide generalisations from such a narrow sampling of 
firms, the case study nevertheless considers both Ford and Volkswagen as typical 
organisations for analysis, meaning that they are considered to be somewhat reflective of, at 
least, German and American firms. The two have been carefully chosen to be broadly similar 
in size, ownership, markets, products and workforce, and therefore can only be considered 
reflective of other firms that share the above characteristics, to the extent to which they share 
these characteristics (Denscombe 2010: 60). However, how the firms differ is of equal 
importance to the case study as what they share. In order to be appropriate candidates for 
comparison, it is crucial that both Ford and Volkswagen embody the divergent labour 
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relations to be discussed above. In order to illustrate this, a content analysis has been 
conducted on several corporate-made documents relating to labour relations. These 
documents have been to coded according a schedule which consists of three primary codes 
determined by the industrial relations models outlined above: Codetermination, Market 
Forces and Social Concerns. 
 
Company-created documents are useful because they “represent the culmination of the efforts 
of teams of professionals tasked with presenting information that casts their firms in the best 
possible light”; therefore embodying messages that the companies consider to be of greatest 
importance (Mikler 2007: 75). Coding of such reports will therefore reflect how the 
companies themselves perceive their relations with labour by highlighting how each firm 
frames and explains its responsibilities, processes, liabilities etc. Two different documents 
have been chosen from each firm for this analysis; company Codes of Conduct and selected 
parts of annual reports. Both of these documents were not considered in their entirety, instead 
the analysis focused on specific sections relating to employees and labour relations.  
 
Coding Results and the LME and CME Labour Models 
 
The coding was completed on Codes of Conducts and Annual Reports specifically because 
they are catering to different audiences, giving increased insight into how the firms seek to 
portray their industrial relations to investors and employees. Table 3.2 (below) details the 
percentage share of Volkswagen and Ford‟s Code of Conducts and Annual Reports of the 
Codetermination, Market Forces and Social Concerns codes. Taken together, the Codes of 
Conduct and the Annual Reports have a 50-50 share of total codes. It should be noted, 
however, that Ford‟s Code of Conduct was longer relative to its Annual Report, while 
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Volkswagens Annual Report was longer relative to its Code of Conduct. For example, Fords 
Code of Conduct had a 64.1% share of Ford‟s total codes, while Volkswagen‟s Annual 
Report had a 58.9% share of its total codes. We could therefore expect the reflective lengths 
of the different documents to skew the results, as each document favours certain codes; for 
example the Codes of Conduct favours Social Concern codes. However, being aware of this, 
we can nevertheless make several observations.  
 
Firstly, both Ford and Volkswagen drew the majority of their Social Concern codes from 
their Codes of Conduct; including 67% of Volkswagen‟s Social Concern codes and all of 
Ford‟s. The complete absence of any reference to the community, stakeholders etc. in Ford‟s  
Annual Report is indicative of the low importance social concerns in industrial relations have 
vis-à-vis investors. Meanwhile, Volkswagen derived only 33% of its Social Concern codes 
from its Annual Report; significantly lower than its total share of all codes. Therefore, both 
clearly illustrate a reduced emphasis on social concerns in material intended for investors. 
However, this is not particularly surprising. What is particularly surprising about the findings 
is that 67% of Volkswagen‟s Market Forces codes came from its Code of Conduct not its 
Annual Report. Indeed, the two Market Forces codes from the Annual Report related to 
financial obligations and labour costs; meaning that there were no references to 
competitiveness, market conditions and demands, or even business performance. This is in 
stark contrast to Ford, which derived 62% of its Market Forces codes from its Annual Report, 
despite the section under analysis being a single page long. This included multiple references 
to productivity, flexibility and competition/competitors. Meanwhile, only 32% of Ford‟s 
Codetermination codes came from its Annual Report. Consequently, it can be concluded that 
while Ford considers codetermination to be of primary importance when communicating with 
its employees, Volkswagen considers it a priority for employees and investors alike.  
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Table 3.2 Code of Conducts and Annual Reports Share (%) of Codes 
 Volkswagen 
Code of 
Conduct (%) 
Volkswagen 
Annual Report 
(%) 
Ford Code of 
Conduct (%) 
Ford Annual 
Report (%) 
Codetermination 36% 64% 68% 32% 
Market Forces 67% 33% 38% 62% 
Social Concerns 67% 33% 100% 0% 
Source: Company Reports (Ford 2007b, 2010; Volkswagen 2010b, 2010c). Note: Rounded to 
the nearest 1% 
 
The coding results indicate that there is a divergence in the manner in which Ford and 
Volkswagen seek to communicate their key priorities, and what they consider those priorities 
to be. Even the titles of the sections in which they discussed their industrial relations 
indicated such differences. Volkswagen‟s discussion of its employees occurred under an 
„Employees‟ subtitle within a section entitled „Value-Enhancing Factors‟. In the discussion 
that followed, Volkswagen primarily focused on training and employee knowledge, career 
pathways, and employee-developing programs. It also made repeated references to the link 
between training, employee expertise and the manufacturing processes that embody the 
„Volkswagen Way‟. For example, comments like “Volkswagen ensures that its employees 
acquire and continue to expand both basic and expert knowledge for their field of 
activity...The primary focus of all training programs is on practical relevance” (Volkswagen 
2010b: 196), were common. Similar sentiments were also expressed in the Code of Conduct:  
 
“We create an environment which provides personal and professional prospects for 
our employees, in which exceptional  performance...We invest in the skills and 
competence of our employees...We are committed to working with employee 
representatives in candor and trust, to conducting a constructive and co-operative 
dialogue, and to striving for a just balance of interests” (Volkswagen 2010c: 8). 
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Volkswagen‟s coding results thus indicate an adherence to the CME labour relations model. 
It was more likely to reference cooperation and dialogue with employees, to emphasise 
training, and to mention stakeholders more broadly. 
 
The section of the Ford Annual Report which discussed employees specifically, and was thus 
coded for analysis, was entitled „Employment Data‟, and was included in the „Financial 
Content‟ section. Immediately it is apparent that Ford views its employees quite differently 
than does Volkswagen, based on the location of this discussion within the Annual Report 
alone. That is, Ford views its employees as „data‟ as opposed to a „value-adding factor‟, as 
Volkswagen does. Ford‟s discussion of its employees in its Annual Report centred primarily 
around the costs and flexibility of labour; and the impact of this on competitiveness, unlike 
Volkswagen emphasis on development and training. The following paragraph summarises the 
overall sentiment well:  
 
“In March 2009, Ford-UAW membership ratified modifications to the existing 
collective bargaining agreement that significantly improved our competitiveness, 
saving us up to $500 million annually and bring us near to competitive parody with 
the U.S. operations of foreign-owned automakers. The operational changes affected 
wage and benefit provisions, productivity, job security programs, and capacity 
actions, allowing us to increase manufacturing efficiency and flexibility” (Ford 
2010: 178). 
 
Ford‟s coding results thus indicates an adherence to the LME labour relations model. While it 
included codetermination codes by nature of its unionised workforce, it was still very much 
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framed around market concerns, such as what competitors are doing, the costs of labour to 
the bottom line, and flexibility. The above discussion is summarised in table 3.3 below, 
which compares the results to the labour relations model established earlier.  
 
Table 3.3 Coding Results and Industrial Relation Models Compared 
 Volkswagen Ford 
Business-Labour 
Relations 
Emphasises Employee 
Representation and Dialogue.  
Acknowledges Positive 
Contribution of Workers, but 
Makes Reference to Industrial 
Action. 
Negotiations Collectively, with Unions.  Collectively, with Unions. 
Unions and Employer 
Groups 
Coordinates with Unions and 
Workers Councils.  
Negotiates with Unions.  
Shareholder Versus 
Stakeholder Value 
Stakeholders mentioned in 
both the Code of Conduct and 
Annual Report. References to 
the „Common Good‟ also 
Present.  
Stakeholders Mentioned in Code 
of Conduct Only; Financial 
Performance is Stressed in 
Annual Report.  
Job Security Long-Term Investment in 
Employee Development and 
Training, While Providing 
Career Pathways.  
Job Security Through 
Negotiations with Unions.   
Productivity Training, Education and 
Floor-Level Expertise 
Stressed. 
The Cost and Flexibility of 
Labour Stressed.  
Hierarchy Worker Autonomy 
Mentioned 
Worker Autonomy not 
Mentioned.  
Welfare State Not Discussed. Not Discussed.  
Source: Company Reports (Ford 2007b, 2010; Volkswagen 2010b, 2010c). 
 
Ford and Volkswagen: Coding Results Compared 
 
It should be immediately apparent from the tables below that Codetermination codes had a 
higher frequency. This is for two reasons. Firstly, while the section on employees and human 
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resources in the Ford annual report was just a single page long, the Volkswagen one was 
several pages, and gave much greater detail. Secondly,  practically all of Ford‟s hourly 
employees in America are represented by a union (Ford 2010: 178). This is not unique to 
Ford, but rather is reflective of the industry more broadly.  According to the American 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011), durable goods manufacturing is amongst the most 
unionised industries in the country, with an 11% unionisation rate, compared to the 7.7% of 
the general private sector workforce, however both are still much lower than Germany‟s 38% 
(Lawrence 2000: 131). This means that there are several references to unions and collective 
bargaining in the Ford documents. Nevertheless, as shown in table 3.4, it is clear that 
Volkswagen made by far the most references to Codetermination, having a 74% share of the 
total of such references, while Ford had a 78% share of Market Forces codes. Both had a 
perfect 50-50 share of Social Concerns.  
 
Table 3.4 Coding of Codetermination, Market Forces and Social Concerns 
 Codetermination Market Forces Social Concerns 
Ford 31 (26%)  21 (78%) 12 (50%) 
Volkswagen 89 (74%) 6 (22%) 12 (50%) 
Total 120 27 24 
Source: Company Reports (Ford 2007b, 2010; Volkswagen 2010b, 2010c) 
 
Volkswagen had higher instances of every category of Codetermination code, especially 
Training; which Ford had no references to. Training included discussion of education, 
recruiting quality employees, and the emphasising of the expertise that floor level employees 
have. Other clearly dominant fields for Volkswagen included Quality (100% share) and 
Supporting Employees (88% share). Quality included all references to the importance of 
healthy labour relations, an innovative workforce, and the standardisation of labour process, 
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to maintaining product quality. Meanwhile, Supporting Employees refers to discussion of 
employee satisfaction, personal development, and job security. Both companies were more 
evenly matched on Coordination with Employees and Rules, Laws and Regulations; although 
Volkswagen still had the edge on both (61% and 56% share, respectfully). The former refers 
to dialogue and employee representation, unions and collective bargaining, employee 
autonomy, mutual interest and obligations, relationship building and trust, and the value of 
employees to overall business success. However, of Ford‟s 15 Coordination with Employees 
codes, 9 were references to the American UAW union, and the Canadian CAW union, with 
whom the company has negotiated collective bargaining arrangements.  
 
Table 3.5 Breakdown of Codetermination Codes  
 Volkswagen Ford 
Quality 7 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Supporting Employees 15 (88%) 2 (12%) 
Coordination With 
Employees 
23 (61%) 15 (39%) 
Training 26 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Rules, Laws and 
Regulations 
18 (56%) 14 (44%) 
Total 89 (74%) 31 (26%) 
Source: Company Reports (Ford 2007b, 2010; Volkswagen 2010b, 2010c) 
 
Furthermore, these often coincided with discussion of competitiveness, flexibility and costs. 
Seven of Ford‟s 10 Market Condition references where directed towards competitiveness 
and/or competitors, and all but two of these occurred alongside the discussion of unions and 
collective bargaining. Additionally, all 3 Productivity references occurred in the same 
context. Meanwhile, Volkswagen had but one reference between Productivity and Market 
Conditions. The highest code for Volkswagen under Market Forces was Business 
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Performance, although as a share this was still on 36%. This refers to sales, profits and 
growth, risk management and the costs and financial obligations of human resources. Once 
again, 4 of Ford‟s 7 references to Business Performance were in relation to the financial costs 
of labour as per the negotiations with the unions. Surprisingly, Ford made no direct 
references to its shareholders in either document, with the sole reference to shareholders 
coming from Volkswagen. However, this occurred within a listing of several stakeholders, 
that is “we act responsibly, for the benefit of our customers, shareholders and employees”. 
Notably, Ford also made the sole reference to industrial action, which occurred alongside the 
discussion of the negotiated collective agreement with the UAW union. While this was only 
of a low occurrence (just once), it is nevertheless indicative of the perception that Ford has of 
the role of unions within its company.  
 
Table 3.6 Breakdown of Market Forces Codes  
 Volkswagen Ford 
Industrial Action 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
Productivity 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 
Shareholders 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Business Performance 4 (36%) 7 (64%) 
Market Conditions  1 (9%) 10 (91%) 
Total 6 (22%) 21 (78%) 
Source: Company Reports (Ford 2007b, 2010; Volkswagen 2010b, 2010c) 
 
Social Concerns are more nuanced than Codetermination and Market Forces codes, and this 
is reflected in the results. Much of this nuance is attributable to the use of Hall and Soskice‟s 
LME-CME binary model. This model was selected because its emphasis on firm 
relationships was more suitable for the case study being conducted, however it does have the 
negative consequence of obscuring the variety that exists within each of the „models‟ (M. 
Madison Cartwright                                                                                                                       Page 40 of 90 
 
Watson 2003: 227-31). For example, it was argued in the previous section that CME firms 
are more responsive to stakeholder concerns. However, it is noted that Japan puts greater 
influence on stakeholders and other social concerns primarily because of traditions and 
conventions, while Germany does so because it is mandated by law (Dore 2000: 116-17). 
Indeed, coding analysis of firm reports conducted elsewhere has shown that Japanese firms 
are more likely to reference social concerns such as those listed in Table 3.7 (below), when 
compared with German and American firms (Mikler 2007: 79). Therefore, while the coding 
has shown that both Volkswagen and Ford have appeared to have given equal weight to 
social concerns, this need not be interpreted as a divergence from the model detailed in Table 
3.1. Instead, it is reflective of the preferences that exist within the CME and LME models, 
specifically, between nations like Germany and others like Japan, which are often grouped 
together.  
 
Table 3.7 Breakdown of Social Concerns Codes 
 Volkswagen Ford 
Gender Equity  1 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Company Values 3 (43%) 4 (57%) 
Community  2 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Stakeholders 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 
Reputation 2 (29%) 5 (71%) 
Total 12 (50%) 12 (50%) 
Source: Company Reports (Ford 2007b, 2010; Volkswagen 2010b, 2010c) 
 
Company Programs 
 
The above coding is reinforced by the actual processes and programs that exist within the 
respective companies. For example, Volkswagen sources many of its employees when they 
are undergoing vocational training, and then directs them to departments suited to their 
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acquired skills and knowledge. During this time, it provides programs for the personal 
development of talented individuals, including the international employment exchange 
program „Wanderjahre‟, as well the StartUp Direct training program, which gives university 
students employment and additional training seminars over the course of two years, all of 
which are designed to give the students a „head start‟ in the company. The company also runs 
an „AutoUni‟ in conjunction with six universities. Its purpose is to “ensure the transfer of 
academic knowledge within the group, thereby increasing Volkswagen‟s capacity for 
innovation”, and supervises 309 doctoral students (Volkswagen 2010b: 195). It is noteworthy 
that these programs are directed at employees just at the beginning stages of their career in 
the company, and are therefore made on the assumption that the employees will remain with 
the company for some time. Volkswagen also runs continuous training programs for its 
employees throughout their time with the company. In 2010, 51,500 employees received 
additional training through 8,896 seminars in areas such as factory automation, robotics, and 
application engineering/management (Volkswagen 2010b: 195).  
 
Volkswagen‟s supervisory board is also consistent with the CME model. As mentioned 
above, many of the codetermination processes in Germany are mandated by law, and thus 
apply to Volkswagen. Its supervisory board includes the Minister for Economic Affairs, 
Labour and Transport for the Federal State of Lower Saxony; the Minister-President of the 
Federal State of Lower Saxony (a major shareholder in the company); the chairmen of the 
Volkswagen Commercial Vehicle Works Council; the first-chairmen of the IG Metall union; 
and a representative elected by the company‟s annual general meeting (Volkswagen 2010b: 
19). The role of the Supervisory Board is to support the Board of Management by providing 
“advice on issues relating to the management of the company, in compliance with the legal 
requirements and the German Corporate Governance Code”, in addition to consulting on “all 
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decisions of fundamental importance for the Group, as well as discussing current strategic 
issues with the Board of Management at regular intervals” (Volkswagen 2010b: 16). 
Volkswagen‟s Supervisory Board thus includes representatives from labour and the state as 
well as business; and is therefore an example of the sort of coordination expected under the 
CME model.  
 
Ford also provides training for its employees, however this was mentioned nowhere in its 
Annual Report. It does mention on its corporate website, however, that it provides “web-
based and classroom training, special projects and task forces, as well as mentoring and 
coaching” for its employees (Ford 2011a). However, there is also an expectation that 
employees “invest in their own professional development by developing an Individual 
Development Plan…to help them meet current and future goals while maximizing 
performance in their current assignments” (Ford 2011a emphasis added). Individual 
Development Plans are a form of self-monitoring whereby employees set out professional 
goals, and track their progress in consult with their supervisors. There is therefore a strong 
individual focus within the training programs, which exists alongside managerial oversight. 
Other programs, such as the internal „colleges‟ and the Global Executive Leadership 
Program, cater to executive and management level positions, not shop-level employees. 
Overall, Ford proclaims that its human resource strategy, including all its training programs, 
must align with its ONE Ford objectives, which considers improving the technical skills of 
employees as an “expected behavior” of the employees themselves, rather than a 
responsibility or strategy of Ford (Ford 2011b). Therefore, Ford‟s training programs less 
resemble a codetermination approach, and focus more on the individualism and managerial-
centric characteristics of the LME model.  
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Conclusion  
 
It is clear from the above analysis that Ford by and large adheres to the LME model while 
Volkswagen adheres to the CME models, despite some only minor divergences. In particular, 
Volkswagen showed much higher tendency to mention training as an import labour strategy, 
while Ford was more likely to mention market concerns such as competition when discussing 
its labour relations. The coding also indicates that both firms can be used as typical units of 
analysis for the purpose of a case study. While the differing attitudes were reflected in coding 
results, practical applications of these were also evident in the actual processes and programs 
of the firms. While it has been argued that the above analysis indicates that both firms are 
reflective of the either the CME or LME model, even if they are not, the analysis still 
nevertheless indicates that both firms differ significantly in their attitudes and actions in 
relation to labour relations. That is to say, there is a clear difference between Ford and 
Volkswagen vis-à-vis labour relations.  
  
Madison Cartwright                                                                                                                       Page 44 of 90 
 
Chapter Four: The South African Political Economy and its Export 
Processing Zones 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter illustrated that Ford and Volkswagen have divergent labour relations 
when operating in their domestic environments. Now the thesis will turn to establishing 
whether or not they continue these divergent practices when operating in the same, but 
foreign, institutional environment. In order to determine this, the following chapter will first 
examine what foreign institutional environment the firms will be operating in. Broadly 
speaking, the case study will be comparing the firms in South African EPZ. Such zones, 
especially in developing countries such as South Africa, are ideal for comparison as they are 
often considered environments which are the most conductive to forcing convergence on 
„liberal‟ labour relations (Ge 1999; Mittelman 2000: 156-58). This is because they are often 
viewed as attempts by states to leverage abundant cheap labour in order to access foreign 
capital (Caspersz 1998: 263; Kumar 1989: 18, 112). The following chapter will begin by 
analysing EPZ‟s, specifically what they are, why they are used by developing nations, and 
how they operate. It will then consider the political economy of South Africa, and its main 
characteristics. It will finally turn to the two zones being used in this case study; the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Logistics Park, and the Coega Industrial Development Zone. It will discuss the 
incentives and benefits of both zones, and how they relate to an overall developmental 
strategy in light of the previous discussion. By doing so this chapter will thus outline the 
institutional environment in which the Volkswagen and Ford will be analysed.  
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Export Processing Zones 
 
Many developing nations, including South Africa, are net capital importers, meaning that 
they rely on foreign finance to fund their development (IMF 2011: 175; Mosley 2008: 677).  
In order to access this foreign capital, these economies will need to secure foreign currency 
reserves and loans, which must be payed or repaid using income derived from exports 
(Strange 1997: 186). According to orthodox economics, developing countries enjoy a 
comparative advantage in unskilled and semi-skilled labour intensive production (Mosley 
2008: 684; Yuan and Eden 1992: 1028). Therefore, in order to access the capital they need to 
develop, developing countries should export products that require labour intensive 
production.  
 
Developing countries are in intense competition with one another for attracting and retaining 
foreign firms; creating further pressure for them to leverage their unskilled labour supplies 
and reduce labour costs (Barrientos 2002: 62; Goodwin 2005: 155-56). According to some 
scholars, this international environment creates incentives for developing nations to compete 
by lowering effective labour standards; the so-called „race-to-the-bottom‟ (ICFTU 1999; 
Pantano and Salomone 2008: 326). This amounts to a practice of „social dumping‟, and an 
“implicit governmental subsidy to foster exports by minimising workers protection” (Valor 
2006: 264). One strategy that has been used are EPZ‟s, which establish special incentives to 
attract foreign investors to import materials for processing before re-exporting the value-
added products (ILO 2007). While EPZ‟s offer a number of incentives, their large pools of 
low-wage workers, as their comparative advantage, is widely considered one of the most 
important factors in attracting foreign capital (Caspersz 1998: 263; Kumar 1989: 18, 112). 
EPZ‟s are thus institutional creations, designed to enable developing countries to leverage 
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their abundant resources (labour) to gain access to resources that are locally scarce (capital)  
(McCallum 2011: 1).  
 
Marxist scholar Burawoy (1983: 588-90) considers EPZ‟s to be attempts at restoring the 
„despotic‟ labour relations of the 19th century that preceded the creation of the welfare state 
and the passing of industrial relations legislation. They are the result of a neoliberal political 
agenda to make territoriality superfluous, and to marginalise the nation state (H. Watson 
2004: 45, 52). Donella Caspersz calls this the “osmosis effect”, which creates a series of same 
places across the globe to be utilised by large corporations (1998: 261-65). Because these 
EPZ‟s are considerably similar, they lower the costs of capital mobility and running an 
international assembly line (Mittelman 2000: 156-58). According to some critics, EPZ‟s 
essentially create environments in which large MNC‟s “can establish virtually any hours, 
conditions of work and wage structure they choose” (McNally 2002: 134). Some zones have 
been reported to distribute birth control pills to female employees; to demand excessively 
long shifts of to up to 16 hours a day; to deny toilet breaks and water; to issue beatings as 
punishment; to pay employees below local minimum wage laws, and; to show little regard for 
employee safety (McNally 2002: 132-34; Santoro 2000: 98-101). They are therefore further 
symptoms of globalisation-induced convergence along neoliberal forms of governance.   
 
However, while EPZ‟s, much like the „neoliberal state‟, are often defined by what they lack 
they are by no means deterritorialised areas (R. B. Hall and Biersteker 2002: 12). Analyses of 
EPZ‟s in the Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea by McKay (2004), Caspersz (1998) and 
Young-Sook Lee (1999) have illustrated the crucial importance that the state and local 
conditions play in a firm‟s decision to locate production in those zones. These include 
infrastructure, taxes and social safety nets; geographical proximity to markets and suppliers; 
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local labour skills and technologies; suppressions of class solidarity; and cultural and 
language similarities between the host nation and the investing firms (Caspersz 1998: 256-61; 
Y. S. Lee 1999: 353-56; Likosky 2003). In the Masan EPZ in South Korea, the above 
institutions were able to retain two thirds of the firms after a wave of unionisation saw wages 
increase by 254% between 1987 and 1989 (Y. S. Lee 1999: 342-52). Similarly, firms in 
Filipino EPZ‟s rely heavily on the state resources to control employee movement, suppress 
unionisation, and train and educate workers, even in privately owned zones (McKay 2004: 
184-90). This has lead Michael Likosky to conclude that “[i]n reality the zones themselves 
are heavily regulated...the regulations simply favour a particular set of interest”(2003). Just as 
„codetermination‟ provides the social and political institutions of Germany‟s comparative 
advantage, so too do EPZ‟s provide the social and political foundations for developing 
nations to leverage their abundant labour supply to establish their own comparative 
advantage. 
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Table 4.1 Literary Survey of Why EPZ May be Pursued as Policy Over Nation-Wide 
Liberalisation 
Author Country  Why EPZ and not 
nation-wide 
liberalisation? 
Explanation 
Park 
(2005) 
South Korea EPZ are a political 
compromise 
Path dependency makes 
wide-scale reform 
difficult. Considerable 
resistance from unions 
and bureaucrats. 
Ananthanarayanan 
(2008) 
India EPZ are a political 
compromise 
Union dissent would be 
too great to enact 
nation-wide reforms. 
    
Yuan and Eden 
(1992) 
Taiwan, South 
Korea, and China 
EPZ favour the host 
nation 
Gives the host state 
greater control, allows 
it to act proactively to 
globalisation 
Shah and Rivera 
(2007) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
EPZ favour the host 
nation 
Concentrate state‟s 
limited resources, 
allowing it to enforce 
local regulations 
    
Likosky 
(2003) 
All EPZ favour capital Concentrate state‟s 
limited resources, 
allowing it to cater to 
businesses interests 
Rosen 
(2003) 
Mexico EPZ favour capital Shield investors from 
the disadvantages and 
risks of an undeveloped 
economy. 
    
Litwack and Qian 
(1998) 
China and Russia EPZ are catalysts for 
transition 
State can maintain tax 
revenue during 
development. Liberal 
policies introduced 
later. 
Johansson and Nilsson 
(1997) 
Malaysia EPZ are catalysts for 
transition 
ISI can be maintained, 
to be wound back after 
EPZ success provide 
argument for reform. 
Ge 
(1999) 
China EPZ are catalysts for 
transition 
EPZ a laboratory to test 
reforms before 
adopting them more 
broadly. 
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EPZ‟s are strategic policy initiatives perused by developing nations seeking economic 
development within the constraints imposed by the international economic order. While it is 
true that this can mean aligning the policies of the EPZ with those demanded by 
neoliberalism, something must be said for the fact that this is occurring within the confines of 
territorially defined „zones‟. We can therefore expect EPZ‟s to differ from state to state, 
depending on the particular strategy being perused by the government at the time. Indeed 
there are approximately 32 different names for EPZ‟s, such as Special Economic Zones 
(China, India), Industrial Development Zones (South Africa), Maquiladoras (Latin America), 
etc. all of which can indicate differences in incentives and concessions. They can also take 
various forms, such as single-industry, single-commodity, single-factory, and even single-
company (McCallum 2011: 2). EPZ‟s therefore need not follow a particular (neoliberal) 
formula, and actually differ from zone to zone. As Table 4.1 illustrates, they can be used 
towards variety of different ends and can be subject to a variety of different constraints, 
depending on the country they are in.  
 
The South African Developmental State? 
 
The IMF‟s most recent World Economic Outlook (2011) lists South Africa amongst the 
developing countries. However, whilst still developing, it is more accurate to describe South 
Africa as a middle-income economy, much like Poland, Hungary or Brazil. (Black and 
Roberts 2009: 213). As a developing nation, South Africa faces extraordinary pressures to 
pursue neoliberal policies. However, as Linda Weiss (2010: 200) has argued, developing 
nations are keenly aware of the alternative developmental path pursued successfully by the 
newly industrialised economies in Asia, and that these “offer a point of reference and model 
for emulation” for countries such as China, India and South Africa. This may be the case, 
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however shortly after forming democratic government the ANC “recognized that successful 
economic policy was subject to constraints laid down by the international economy” (Aron et 
al. 2009: 6 emphasis added). In particular, a private sector funded export-orientated 
development strategy was considered to be the most „acceptable‟ to international financiers 
and traders.  
 
Meanwhile, international economic organisations also began to play a role in South Africa‟s 
neoliberal trajectory. For example, just as apartheid was ending the World Bank assessed the 
national economy, recommending trade liberalisation, higher interest rates, stable 
macroeconomic conditions (i.e. fiscal discipline), and other measures to „get prices right‟ 
(Black and Roberts 2009: 212-13). Meanwhile, in 1993 the ANC co-signed an agreement 
with the Apartheid government and the IMF accepting a loan with strict fiscal conditions, 
which included reducing the budget deficit to 6% of GDP, abstaining from tax increases, 
controlling public wages and refraining from “excessive” social spending (Tettey 2008: 226). 
The IMF, along with the WTO have also been instrumental in encouraging South Africa‟s 
aggressive trade liberalisation (Aron et al. 2009: 11). From 1993 to 2003, the weighted 
average of trade protection in South Africa dropped from 38.1% to 14.8% on manufactured 
goods (Black and Roberts 2009: 214).  
 
However, while the ANC government initially implemented neoliberal policies, over time 
alternative reforms have gained dominance over the government‟s agenda; resulting in 
increased government involvement in the economy. Trade liberalisation has now slowed in 
favour of industrial policies; privatisation has been marginalised as a main policy initiative; 
and pro-labour reforms have been introduced to increase rather than decrease labour market 
regulation (Aron et al. 2009: 6). However, Lodge (2009) has argued that this does not mean 
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that South Africa is pursuing a developmental model in the tradition of Japan or South Korea. 
He argues that such a model requires strong alliances between the state and particular 
economic interest groups; something South Africa lacks (2009: 253). Schneider and Maxfield 
have similarly argued that South Africa is missing the exchanges in information, reciprocity, 
trust and credibility required for an effective „growth coalition‟ (noted in Seekings and 
Nattrass 2011). Instead, the post-Apartheid South Africa state has sought to discipline and 
transform business, not work with it (Seekings and Nattrass 2011: 340).  
 
Neoliberal policies and „globalisation‟ pressures have been useful tools for disciplining local 
businesses (Seekings and Nattrass 2011: 353). Most economic policies and state-business 
consultation and engagement have benefited international capital and the local black elite, 
while established and powerful domestic white firms have been treated with disdain (Lodge 
2009: 260; Seekings and Nattrass 2011: 352). Organisations such as the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), which was set up to seek consultation with 
business and labour on the post-Apartheid economic transition, has become increasingly 
sidelined and practically rendered irrelevant (Tettey 2008: 229-30). The hostile and 
suspicious relations between local capital and the state means that South Africa cannot be 
described as fitting the developmental state model, despite its high concentration of capital in 
a few large, vertically integrated firms (Seekings and Nattrass 2011: 343). Additionally, high 
unemployment, the prevalence of low-skilled jobs, and the ongoing reliance on casual labour 
for competitiveness, is antithetical to the high skilled development enjoyed by genuine 
developmental states (Lodge 2009: 255-56). Therefore, South Africa‟s political economy 
cannot be accurately described as a developmental model, despite attempts be the state to 
pursue developmental strategies.  
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The Nelson Mandela Bay Logistics Park and the Coega Industrial Development Zone 
 
South Africa‟s EPZ‟s, known as Industrial Development Zones (IDZ), are not attempts to 
establish neoliberal „same places‟ for the use of large firms, but rather areas in which the state 
can play an active role in providing services to help businesses prosper and to encourage 
international investment, exports and employment generation. The development of IDZ‟s 
were included in the wave of neoliberal reforms in the mid to late 1990‟s as the new ANC 
government pinned its hopes of reducing inequality and unemployment on an export-
orientated strategy. While the ANC anticipated establishing a more „traditional‟ EPZ model, 
intense pressure from unions saw a dilution of the purpose of the zones, and an overall lack of 
consensus on zone-led strategies right from the onset (McCallum 2011: 13).  This resulted in 
a much more regulated structure than other models. For example, labour laws are the same 
for both the zoned and non-zoned economy (McCallum 2011: 3). As the zones are not 
exempt from national labour laws, unions have been able to establish a strong presence in 
them, albeit with greater difficultly due to heavy monitoring from management. Overall, 
wages and conditions conform to national standards, and by some accounts are even higher 
(McCallum 2011: 14).  
 
However, a number of other concessions and incentives are available in the zones, such as 
duty suspensions on imports for production-related raw materials, as well as value-added-tax 
exemptions, six year tax holidays, and access to Custom Controlled  Area‟s that provide 
streamlined administration for customs requirements  (CDC 2011b; DTI Feb 2011; 
McCallum 2011: 13). The Coega IDZ covers an area of 11,000 hectares and is managed by 
the Coega Development Corporation (CDC), a state-owned enterprise formed in 1999 
specifically for that purpose (CDC 2011a; NAACAM 2011). With a total investment of 
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USD$1.8 billion, it is the largest development in South Africa since democratisation, and is 
the largest EPZ in the African continent (McCallum 2011: 14). The Coega IDZ is also host to 
one of Ford‟s two factories in South Africa.  
 
In March 2008 the CDC also took responsibility for the management of the Nelson Mandela 
Bay Logistics Park (NMBLP), although the park remains in full government ownership 
(06/03/2008). The park was built in a strategic partnership between the Nelson Mandela Bay 
government and Volkswagen, and is located directly opposite Volkswagens Uitenhage 
factory (CDC 2009: 21-23). This strategic partnership continues today, with the NMBLP 
being “fully supported” by Volkswagen, although it also hosts suppliers for other factories 
(CDC 2009: 35). The NMBLP is not an IDZ, and therefore does not benefit from the above 
concessions. However, while it may not receive the same incentives as the Coega IDZ, it is 
nevertheless the recipient of substantial assistance from various levels of government. For 
example, in 2009  the Eastern Cape Provincial Government funded a R140 million project to 
construct three warehouses to be used by private companies in the park (CDC 2009: 18). 
Such a public expense on providing private goods can be considered a subsidy. Additionally, 
the NMBLP also receives a number of services from the state. Remembering that EPZ‟s need 
not follow a single formula, we can thus consider the NMBLP an EPZ in that it is a spatially 
defined area that receive special considerations and services that are not available to the 
broader economy.  
 
In many cases the services provided to the zones by the CDC by far surpass the quality 
available in the general economy. Even quality telecommunications and transport 
infrastructure are  luxuries in a country that has seen decreased investment in public 
infrastructure since 1994, and as a result, lags behind a number of other middle income 
Madison Cartwright                                                                                                                       Page 54 of 90 
 
economies on key infrastructure benchmarks (Plessis and Smit 2009: 47). Furthermore, the 
infrastructure within the zones can be „customised‟ to the needs of the investing firms 
(NAACAM 2011). The CDC also provides training programs; an important service in a 
location that is experiencing severe skill shortages in the electrical, mechanical, construction, 
manufacturing, engineering and call centre industries (CDC 2008: 48). In 2009 alone, the 
CDC, in partnership with the Sector Education and Training Authorities, trained a total of 
5,835 people in 13 different trades (CDC 2009: 53). Other services include 24-hour security 
provided to the sites; world standard guaranteed practices in design, construction, safety and 
management, and; employee accommodation provided close to the zones (NAACAM 2011). 
This does not paint the picture of a hands-off neoliberal state, but rather an active and 
interventionist state. The zones are thus not „same places‟ that have created a „race to the 
bottom‟ environment, but are, however, spatially defined areas that enable the government to 
provide the sort of investment and services it is unable to afford and/or deliver to the 
economy more broadly.  
 
There are several observations that can be made about South Africa‟s zones. Firstly, they, 
like all EPZ‟s, specifically favour foreign firms engaged in the export of value-added 
products. This brings capital for development and for generating local employment, while at 
the same time enabling the South African government to „discipline and transform‟ local 
business as noted by Seekings and Nattrass above (2011: 353). Secondly, the South African 
government has also been able to align the policies of the zones with other initiatives, such as 
its training and employment programs. For example, the CDC coordinates with the Expanded 
Public Works Programme for its training initiatives and investments in the zones and their 
infrastructure (CDC 2008: 54; 2009: 54). Therefore, the South African state is using the 
zones to gain greater control over developmental strategies and to engage proactively in the 
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international economy as Yuan and Eden (1992) have argued. Thirdly, focussing the state‟s 
resources on providing infrastructure and other key services to a geographically concentrated 
area benefits not only the states developmental strategy, but also the investing firms. 
Fourthly, powerful unions have ensured that labour rights are protected, therefore indicating 
that (a) the zones do not appear to encourage the sort of „despotic‟ labour reactions 
anticipated by Mittelman (2000), McNally (2002) and others, and (b) that such low labour 
standards are not required of all EPZ‟s. Overall, the zones therefore „favour the host nation‟ 
and „favour capital‟, however to not appear to either a „political compromise‟ or a „catalyst 
for transition‟.  
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Table 4.2 Observations on South Africa’s Zones 
EPZ are a political 
compromise 
Applies to South Africa?  Why? 
Path dependency makes 
wide-scale reform difficult.  
No.  South Africa‟s zones are in many 
ways less liberal than the general 
economy, meaning they are not an 
alternative to wide-scale liberal 
reforms.  
EPZ favour the host 
nation 
   
Gives the host state greater 
control, and concentrates 
its limited resources, thus 
allowing it to act 
proactively to globalisation 
Yes.  The zones have also enabled the 
state to offer services, 
infrastructure, and programs 
which it is unable to offer the 
broader economy.  
EPZ favour capital    
Concentrate state‟s limited 
resources, allowing it to 
cater to businesses interests 
Yes.  Business benefit from more 
efficient state services while 
inside the zones. They also 
receive customisable 
infrastructure, effective subsidies, 
and free training for employees. 
Employees are also conveniently 
located nearby due to state-
provided housing.  
Shield investors from the 
disadvantages and risks of 
an undeveloped economy. 
Yes.   Receive better infrastructure than 
the rest of the economy, and 
receive 24 hour security.  
EPZ are catalysts for 
transition 
   
State can maintain tax 
revenue during 
development. Liberal 
policies introduced later. 
No.   Policies in South Africa have 
become less, not more liberal in 
recent years.  
ISI can be maintained, to 
be wound back after EPZ 
success provide argument 
for reform. 
No.  South Africa‟s zones have many 
interventionist characteristics, and 
therefore could not be used as an 
effective argument for wide 
spread liberal reforms  
EPZ a laboratory to test 
reforms before adopting 
them more broadly. 
Maybe.  This is yet to be seen.  
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Conclusion  
 
South Africa has succumbed to many of the pressures calling for neoliberal policy to attract 
foreign capital, however has also managed to pursue more developmental strategies, albeit 
with limited success. On the surface, it may appear that the IDZ‟s and logistics parks are a 
concession to the neoliberal pressures, indicating a political compromise that seeks to localise 
and limit neoliberal reform. However, the zones do not follow a neoliberal formula. Firstly, 
they do not seek to exploit abundant and cheap labour, instead granting the same rights and 
conditions to workers and unions as those that exist in the general economy. Secondly, the 
state is more engaged and involved in these zones, proving services and infrastructure that it 
is unable to provide to the economy more broadly. The zones thus benefit the state, which can 
use the zones in conjunction with other initiatives, and can utilise the limited spatiality of the 
zones to provide services to business. Capital also benefits, as it receives better infrastructure, 
services etc. than would otherwise be available. 
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Chapter Five: Volkswagen and Ford in South Africa 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have laid the ground work of the case study by establishing and 
defining the parameters and subjects. This chapter will now compare Volkswagen and Ford 
in their operations in the South African zones. It will compare each firm‟s industrial relations 
strategies with the LME and CME models established in Chapter Three, as well as to each 
other. Taking into consideration South Africa‟s local industrial relations environment, it will 
argue that both firms have, overall, retained their respective approaches while adapting where 
necessary to local conditions. Firstly, the chapter will establish what these local conditions 
are, and the implications they have on the strategies of the firms. Secondly, it will consider 
Volkswagen and Ford in turn, and analyse how their strategies are reflective of CME and 
LME approaches, and how they have been/not been affected by local conditions in South 
Africa. Finally, it will examine the findings and compare the results from the two firms. In 
doing so it will conclude that both firms have retained the strategies of their national 
identities.  
 
South African Corporatism? 
 
Both before and after Apartheid was abandoned, the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) and the ANC had allied themselves in order to pursue political goals (Lawrence 
2000: 122-24). COSATU  is the largest labour federation in South Africa (Collins 2004: 6), 
which has a unionisation rate of 40% (Collins 2004: 6,11). In the automotive industry, 
approximately 80% of the workforce is organised under the National Union of Metalworkers 
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of South Africa (NUMSA) with an additional 10% belonging to other unions (Collins 2004: 
6; Hirschsohn et al. 2000: 60). The high levels of unionisation are in part a result of a 
favourable legislative environment. Between 1994 and 1999, three pro-labour acts were 
passed: the Labour Relations Act of 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, 
and the Employment Equity Act of 1999. All of these strengthened employee positions vis-à-
vis wage negotiations and employment security (Aron et al. 2009: 16-17). Additionally, 
labour has also been successful in mitigating employee hostility to centralised bargaining; has 
secured the constitutional right to strike, including political and sympathy strikes; and has 
witnessed the South African Supreme Court rule lockouts unconstitutional (Lawrence 2000: 
121-25). South African unions therefore wield considerable clout in their own right, in 
addition to being heavily embedded with the ruling party. 
 
As this pro-labour environment applies equally both inside and outside the zones, all of 
Ford‟s hourly staff at the IDZ-based Struandale Engine Plant, accounting for 89% of the total 
employed at the factory, are unionised (Ford 2007a). Likewise, 80% of Volkswagen‟s 
employees at the non-zoned Uitenhage plant are unionised (Desai 2008: 37). Scholars such as 
Hirschohn et al (2000: 56) have argued that COSATU and its affiliates capitalised on their 
growing strength relative to the then weakening South African  state during the 1980‟s to 
early 1990‟s by implementing corporatist structures. These have benefited labour while 
developing “consensus-based industrial policy” via coordination between business, organised 
labour and the government. Another major corporatist-like concession won by the union 
movement is the  Workplace Forum; the “functional equivalent of German works councils” 
(Lawrence 2000: 121). It would therefore appear that the union movement and the state in 
South Africa have implemented and pursued a number of German-style codetermination 
strategies, both on the industry and shopfloor level.  
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Because of its considerable size and significance, NUMSA was one of the first unions to 
become actively engaged in policy making at the industry level (Hirschsohn et al. 2000: 57). 
For example, in 1989 NUMSA effectively used “its shopfloor militancy and organisational 
strength” (Hirschsohn et al. 2000: 64) to coerce several of the large automotive manufacturers 
into establishing a National Bargaining Forum (NBF). The NBF is a bargaining council; an 
organisation through which collective bargaining is South Africa generally takes place. Since 
the 1980‟s the number of employees covered by the councils more than doubled, spurred by 
the Labour Relations Act of 1995, which has encouraged the creation of centralised councils 
(Godfrey et al. 2007: 15). Bargaining councils include representatives from both business and 
labour, and in this sense are strongly reminiscent of the corporatist structures of coordination 
by institutionalised interest groups often seen in CME‟s. NUMSA represents labour while 
seven of South Africa‟s largest automotive manufacturers (including Volkswagen and Ford) 
are represented by the Automobile Manufacturers Employers Organisation (AMEO). 
Meanwhile, the automotive manufacturers and their component suppliers are also represented 
by the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) and 
the National Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM). 
These organisations operate outside the context of collective bargaining (Hirschsohn et al. 
2000: 60). Therefore, the interests of capital and the interests of labour are both represented 
by national organisations recognised by and integrated with the state; again indicative of the 
CME model.  
 
However, what is not indicative of the CME model is the „shopfloor militancy‟ unions have 
used to establish these structures. While unions have developed notable presence in the South 
African economy, cooperative interaction has not materialised, and unions and business have 
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adversarial relations. Many of those in the union movement have been shaped by the 
tumultuous clashes and militant unionism of the Apartheid era, and this has informed their 
interactions with management (Bolsmann 2010: 527-30; Collins 2004: 36-37; McCallum 
2011: 12). Therefore, despite the existence of bargaining councils and other corporatist 
structures, South Africa‟s industrial relations cannot be considered to follow a CME 
codetermination model; mainly because of the ways in which agents interact and utilise these 
so-called „corporatist‟ arrangements.  
 
For example, South African trade unions have yet to embrace or staff the Workplace Forums, 
and have failed to utilise them for organising in the way that German unions have been able 
to (Lawrence 2000: 124-26). Meanwhile, despite its close relationship with the ANC, even 
COSATU agrees with other union federations that consultation with the government is of a 
poor standard (Collins 2004: 9). For example, tired of the inadequacy of official processes 
such as NEDLAC, COSATU has joined other segments of civil society in utilising political 
activism (Tettey 2008: 229-35). In short:  
 
“There are no signs at present that either the ANC government or the business 
community will make a priority of improving employer-employee co-operation or 
building company-level codetermination structures” (Lawrence 2000: 130). 
 
That is to say that while some corporatists structures and institutions have been implemented, 
there are still others that are missing, and which are preventing a genuine form of 
codetermination. This includes more informal institutions, for example German norms of 
trust and reciprocity which can only develop over long periods of time (Goodin 2003: 207-
11). While industry-wide corporatists structures have been somewhat developed, South 
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Africa‟s unions remain suspicious of management and there is little trust between labour and 
business.  
 
Volkswagen  
 
Both Volkswagen‟s Uitenhage and Ford‟s Struandale plants were built several decades ago; 
before the establishment of any of South Africa‟s zones. However, while the Coega IDZ was 
built to include Ford‟s plant, Volkswagen‟s plant lays outside the boundaries of any zone, 
despite the two being just 23km apart. This means that it cannot access the tax breaks and 
other benefits available in the IDZ. Instead of lobbying the government to include Uitenhage 
in the Coega developments borders, Volkswagen has preferred to abstain from the IDZ and 
focus its energies on the NMBLP. This R600 million park was developed in partnership 
between Volkswagen‟s and the provincial government, and primarily serves the needs of the 
Uitenhage plant (Kernohan 23/11/2009). Volkswagen has five main component suppliers in 
the park; Rehau, Bentler, Flextech, Faurecia and Grupo Antolin (Stephens 2008). Only with 
Volkswagen‟s increased production was the park made viable, meaning that involvement and 
cooperation from Volkswagen was crucial for the realisation of the development (Venter 
20/10/2006). The NMBLP was thus a product a cooperative partnership between Volkswagen 
and the state.  
 
However, while Volkswagen has not received any tax breaks, its partnership in the NMBLP 
has brought other benefits. Of the five main suppliers listed above, four received financial 
assistance from the state-owned CDC, totalling R201.9 million (Carte 01/04/2010). The 
establishment of the NMBLP was a crucial step in Volkswagen‟s commercial strategy for 
South Africa. The park‟s suppliers have enabled the company to achieve its goal of 
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increasing the local content of its components to 77%. Volkswagen considered meeting this 
benchmark to be vital to its „globalisation‟ strategy to increase exports from South Africa. 
According to Volkswagen South Africa‟s managing director, David Powels:  
 
“The establishment of the NMBLP has been a crucial step in the process to enable 
Volkswagen to become a globally competitive manufacturer of vehicles in the 
Eastern Cape” (20/11/2009). 
 
Volkswagen‟s emphasis on local content shows a long-term vision for its South African 
operations, which is seen as important to its overall commercial strategy.  Furthermore, the 
NMBLP is located just 2km from the Uitenhage plant, where it is easy to monitor and 
assess. Indeed, some 80% of Volkswagen‟s domestic suppliers are located within a 35km 
radius of the factory (Volkswagen 2010d: 25). Volkswagen‟s decision to centralise its 
suppliers close to its factory reduces its reliance on imported components from far way 
locations that are harder to monitor and influence. However, the company is aware pursuing 
its further goals for local content will not be a simple process, and for this reason it has 
openly appealed to governments of all levels to “work with us” (Venter 26/11/2010). It is 
clear that Volkswagen has willingness, if not a preference, for dealing with the South 
African state in achieving its goals, which is indicative of a CME approach. 
 
As part of its obligations under the ILO‟s Global Compact, Volkswagen has implemented a 
„Global Labour Charter‟ that embodies a “special culture of codetermination” (Volkswagen 
2010a: 3). The charter sets out minimum standards for the entire company, mandating that 
all facilities have some form of employee representation. The Charter was the result of a 
dialogue between the Board of Management and employee representatives, including the 
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International Metalworkers Federation (Volkswagen 2010a: 3). In its progress report on the 
Global Compact in 2010, Volkswagen declared that it is “committed to working with 
employee representatives in candor and trust, to conducting a constructive and co-operative 
dialogue” (Volkswagen 2010a: 4). Codetermination was introduced in Uitenhage as early as 
1979, when it introduced full-time shop stewards. Today, these shop stewards sit on the 
Joint Union-Management Executive Committee alongside senior management, and together 
they consider strategic issues of importance to the company. In this way the committee bears 
some resemblance, albeit in a much more limited form, to the German supervisory boards 
(Masondo 2010: 43-44). Volkswagen South Africa has also done extensive work with 
HIV/AIDS prevention (Volkswagen 2010a: 4). The company has therefore attempted to 
integrate its „culture of codetermination‟ into its South African operations.  
 
However, the independent suppliers located in the NMBLP are obviously not covered by the 
companies „Global Labour Charter‟ with respect to employee representation and other 
codetermination arrangements. Nevertheless, there are strict controls and assessments that 
are conduct by Volkswagen on its suppliers, which encourage codetermination arrangements 
and emplace accountability mechanisms to ensure worker rights. In 2007, the company 
initiated a Better Health and Safety for Suppliers project with the ILO and the German 
Corporation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The project was overseen by a committee 
that also included, once again, the International Metal Workers Federation (Kristjansdottir 
2007: 7-8). The project audited suppliers in order to assess their performance of employee 
health and safety. The goal, however, is not to police and punish, but rather to cooperate 
with the suppliers and support them to increase their performance (Volkswagen 2010d: 27). 
Volkswagen has therefore not only taken an active interest in its suppliers labour relations, 
but has also sought to guide them where possible. 
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In 2005, eight of Volkswagen‟s suppliers in South Africa were audited. Initially, they 
performed poorly with those in Brazil in Mexico. The South African suppliers averaged a 
„poor‟ rating of just 54.44%, while Brazil and Mexico average „good‟ scores of 70.06% and 
80.31%, respectfully (Kristjansdottir 2007: 13-15). However, by the follow-up visit later that 
year, all but one of the suppliers had “made significant progress towards the formulation of a 
comprehensive policy based on social dialogue through the involvement of workers and 
management” (Kristjansdottir 2007: 14 emphasis added). Since then, in 2006, Volkswagen 
established the pilot phase of  a prevention system in cooperation with the South Africa‟s 
Department of Labour in order to continue the progress of its suppliers (Kristjansdottir 2007: 
14). It therefore appears Volkswagen has also influenced some of its suppliers, such as those 
in the NMBLP, into not only improving their performance on health and safety, but also into 
engaging in a codetermination-like „social dialogue‟ between employees and managers.  
 
Volkswagen‟s commitment to the education and training of its employees is also prevalent 
in South Africa, in addition to several other CSR education programs (Volkswagen 2011a). 
Volkswagen‟s training initiatives include the Volkswagen Dealer Academy, which focuses 
on sale skills for its network of retailers, and is run in collaboration with the Department of 
Labour. The company also has a working partnership with the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, which aims to “provide engineering students with research capacity and to help 
them identify applications for new technologies in component and vehicle manufacturing 
processes” (Volkswagen 2011a). Lastly, the company also runs the Volkswagen Learning 
Academy out of its Uitenhage plant, although it is available for local suppliers and 
businesses as well as company employees. Over the past four years the company has 
invested R400-million on the academies, which are able to grant nationally recognised 
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qualifications (Volkswagen 2011a). Such commitment to education and training is indicative 
of the CME approach, as well as being consistent with Volkswagen‟s behaviour in 
Germany, as seen in Chapter Three.  
 
On job security, the findings are mixed. On the one hand, employment at the Uitenhage 
plant fared much worse than employment across the Volkswagen supply chain. This is true 
when compared with employment in Germany, in other developing nations, and globally. 
On the other hand, Volkswagen retained more employees than the South African automotive 
industry as a whole. Figure 5.1 (below) illustrates this by comparing indexes from various 
Volkswagen operations. Overall, it can be concluded that as Volkswagen retained more 
employees than the South African industry as a whole, it displayed a greater commitment to 
job security; a characteristic of the codetermination model.  
 
Figure 5.1 Jobs at Volkswagen  
 
*Russia, India, Argentina, Hungary, Poland, Mexico, Brazil, China. Sources (Volkswagen 
2011c; NAAMSA 2011)  
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However, Volkswagen has had trouble pursuing its codetermination strategies. Despite the 
company‟s attempts for cooperative relationships, many of NUMSA‟s members have 
“viewed this consensual approach with deep suspicion and regarded it as selling out to 
employers” (Masondo 2010: 60). While Volkswagen has been pursuing codetermination, 
many of the union‟s militant members favour adversarial interaction with management 
(Masondo 2010: 61). By and large, many employers in South Africa fail to give full 
information to employees during negotiations, and often negotiate in bad faith (Masondo 
2010: 64). This has combined with historical factors, namely the legacy of the apartheid era 
shopfloor battles, to create a different culture in the South Africa labour movement. As one 
shop steward describes it:  
 
“There is also the co-determination agenda. Unfortunately this is done with the 
blessing of our sister union in Germany - IG Metall. They forget that we come from 
a different school of thought” (Blouw 01/07/2002 emphasis added).  
 
This sentiment has been seen more recently as well. After a strike in September 2010, after a 
breakdown in negotiations with the AMEO, NUMSA released a statement, declaring that:  
 
“we are compelled to take the battle to the streets...Ours will neither be a picnic nor 
a fan park but a metalworkers‟ militant action until our demands are met” (Ngobese 
06/08/2010) 
 
In one infamous case in 2000, Volkswagen was forced to dismiss over 1,380 employees at 
the Uitenhage plant after a prolonged industrial dispute (Bolsmann 2010: 530). The root 
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cause of the dispute is widely considered to be the continuing militanism of the South 
African trade union movement. Specifically, Volkswagen failed to „sell‟ the values of the 
codetermination system it tried to introduce to the plant. The Work Place Forums in 
particular were seen by the employees as a form of co-option (Bolsmann 2010: 526). 
Volkswagen has therefore attempted to introduce codetermination, and CME-style labour 
relations, but has faced opposition from militant unions favouring a more adversarial 
system.  
 
Volkswagen has attempted to implement codetermination labour relations in its South 
African operations, while also encouraging similar arrangements for its suppliers. It has 
pursued the latter goal through initiatives run in conjunction with the South African 
government, while oversight and influence has been made simpler by locating many 
suppliers close to the Uitenhage plant. It has also shown a preference for engaging with the 
government cooperatively in pursuit of commercial strategies, which saw the creation of the 
NMBLP to begin with. Its commitment to job security, while below that of the rest of the 
Volkswagen supply chain, was above that of the South African industry as a whole. Overall, 
the company has maintained a commitment to the CME model, despite struggles with 
certain local conditions such as militant unionism.  
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Table 5.1 Volkswagen in South Africa 
 In Germany  In South Africa  
Business-Labour 
Relations 
Mutually Cooperative 
Relations with Unions.  
Attempted Cooperation With 
Adversarial Unions  
Negotiations Industry-wide Collective 
Bargaining with IG Metall 
Industry-wide Collective 
Bargaining Through the NBF 
Unions and Employer 
Groups 
Coordinates with Unions and 
Workers Councils.  
Member of NAAMSA and the 
AMEO; Cooperates with the 
State in Pursing Strategic Goals 
Shareholder Versus 
Stakeholder Value 
Stakeholders Frequently 
Mentioned by the Company.  
Heavily Invested In Local 
Economy. Runs Some CSR 
Initiatives, Including 
HIV/AIDS and Education 
Programs. Strong Oversight of 
Factory and Suppliers.  
Job Security Long-Term Investment in 
Employee Development and 
Training, While Providing 
Career Pathways.  
Greater Commitment to Job 
Security than the South African 
Auto Industry as a Whole  
Productivity Training, Education and 
Floor-Level Expertise 
Stressed. 
Emphasis on Training and 
Education.  
Hierarchy Employee Representation at 
all Levels; Worker Autonomy 
Stressed 
Employee Representation 
Mandated by the „Global 
Labour Charter‟. Employees 
Present on the Joint Union-
Management Executive 
Committee 
 
Ford 
 
All of Ford‟s hourly staff are covered by the NBF‟s three year collective agreements (Ford 
2007a), the most recent of which was signed in 2010. While there is limited scope within the 
NBF agreement for plant level negotiations, by and large Ford has the exact same working 
conditions, benefits, overtime arrangements etc. across its Struandale and non-zone Silverton 
plants. These are, in turn, broadly the same as those found at Volkswagen, General Motor, 
Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Nissan and Toyota plants. Furthermore, the NBF states in its 
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„objectives‟ that “[t]he Parties record that co-operative and co-determined relations between 
labour and management at all levels are essential for the success of the industry and the 
welfare of its workers”  (NBF 2010: 7 emphasis added).  This language reflects a different 
attitude to labour relations than the one displayed by Ford in the content analysis conducted 
in Chapter Three.  
 
This sort of industry-wide bargaining is antithetical to the American LME style of industrial 
relations. It is also specifically unusual for Ford, despite the high unionisation rates amongst 
its American workforce. Negotiations between Ford and the UAW occur on a national level, 
but not an industry level; that is agreements are signed between Ford and Ford employees 
only (Ford 2011e: 32). Additionally, Ford also conducts local plant level negotiations on 
issues such as “layoff and recall procedures, deviations from the national guidelines for 
overtime assignments, promotional procedures and the rules for changing shift assignments. 
The local negotiations also cover a wide range of additional, purely local issues” (Ford 
2011e: 32). It is therefore apparent that Ford‟s negotiations in South Africa occur on a much 
more centralised basis than they do in America.  
 
The South African agreement itself includes a number of provisions that are highly unusual 
for the LME model. For example, the implementation and provisioning of the agreement is 
the responsibility of a management committee, which comprises of two industry 
representatives, and two union representatives, including the national automobile coordinator 
of NUMSA and the Chairperson of the NUMSA national Shop Steward Council (NBF 2010: 
15). This gives labour representatives executive influence, albeit in a somewhat limited form, 
over the management of the firm‟s industrial relations. The agreement also includes a wage 
structure that dictates how employees are to be paid relative to each other, which is based on 
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just 7 tiers of skill levels, which apply across the entire industry (NBF 2010: 48). Meanwhile 
in America, Ford‟s pay structure applies to 22 skilled classifications, in addition to its 
unskilled classifications and its entry-level and ongoing classifications (UAW 2007: 19). It is 
thus apparent that the conditions of the NBF are more constrictive, and less flexible, than 
those of Ford agreements in America.  
 
Nevertheless, in South Africa Ford has continued a “top-down” (22/07/2011) management 
style which is consistent with strong managerial control of the LME model. It has also 
exhibited a lower commitment to job security during the recent crisis than did Volkswagen. 
In 2008 Ford retrenched 800 workers across all of its operations; 220 of which were from the 
Struandale plant. This compares to Volkswagen‟s 400 retrenchments over the same period of 
time (Solidarity 2009: 6).  NUMSA was dissatisfied with Ford‟s performance during 
retrenchment negotiations, with the company unilaterally announcing the lay-offs while they 
were still underway (Hlangani 26/09/2010). Ford also responded to the crisis by cutting 
working hours, which resulted in an 11 day strike at the Silverton plant in February 2010 
(12/03/2010). All of this is indicative of adversarial relations on behalf of both Ford and the 
unions.  
  
Furthermore, Ford is much less integrated into the South African economy than Volkswagen. 
Although it does currently have the target of increasing its local content to 65%, its so far 
only managed to reach a level of 35% (Venter 20/05/2011). This is under half of the 77% that 
Volkswagen has already achieved through cooperation with the South African government in 
initiatives such as the NMBLP. Furthermore, Ford has sought its goal through unilateral 
investment in is factories, such as its recent R3-billion to expand and modernise both its 
Struandale engine and Silverton plants (Venter 20/05/2011). Instead of asking the 
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government to “work with us”, as Volkswagen has, Ford‟s focus has instead been on its 
market relationships. As Ford South Africa‟s CEO Jeffery Nemeth explains, this includes 
customers and suppliers, not government:  
 
“The launch is on schedule, and we are verifying all our processes and working 
closely with our supplier partners to make sure we exceed the expectations of our 
customers” (Venter 20/05/2011). 
 
Ford has thus not engaged with government as Volkswagen has, indicative of an LME 
approach.  
 
Like Volkswagen, Ford provides education and training programs. Also like Volkswagen, 
some of these are focused on the community, and can therefore be considered CSR initiatives 
(Ford 2011f). Other programs that focus on employees include in-house courses, e-learning, 
external training courses and overseas developmental assignments (Ford 2011d).  However, 
these differ from Volkswagen‟s in several ways. Firstly, they are not coordinated with the 
government or local universities, and are instead provided autonomously. Secondly, they are 
not of the scale as the ones pursued by Volkswagen. Thirdly, as is the case in America, Ford 
considers training and development to be the responsibility of the employees:  
 
“Working with your supervisor, you may take advantage of opportunities - by 
way of coaching, mentoring, regular feedback sessions and accepting different 
assignments” (Ford 2011d). 
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The onus is therefore on the employees to elect to apply themselves for further training. 
Furthermore, as is again the case with Ford‟s operations in America, this takes place with 
oversight from supervisors. Therefore, Ford‟s training is conducted in a manner that is 
indicative of the LME approach, as well as being consistent with its behaviour in America, as 
seen in Chapter Three.  
 
Ford does have a Code of Basic Working Conditions that applies to all of its facilities within 
its international network. The last assessment to be conducted on its Southern Africa 
operations was in 2007. It is important to note that this did not involve any actual physical 
inspection of any factories. Instead, surveys were sent to the management at each facility for 
them to complete. Apart from these assessments, factory managers are expected to complete 
regular health and safety reviews, as well as other general assessments on workplace 
conditions. The company does also provide a local „hotline‟ where complaints can be made, 
however employee representatives have a very minimal role to play, in strong contrast to 
Volkswagen‟s Better Health and Safety for Suppliers project. Overall, the 2007 report 
concluded:  
 
“Based on its history of knowledge and compliance with local legislation, 
collective bargaining agreements and Ford Motor Company global policies, it is 
evident that FMCSA can comply with the Code of Basic Working conditions. 
Robust corrective action processes are in place to monitor compliance and provide 
remediation” (Ford 2007a: 4). 
 
Ford therefore has much fewer safeguards in place than Volkswagen to ensure that workers‟ 
rights are respected at its factories. However, because of the prevalence of unions in South 
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Africa, organisations such as the NBF have gone some way in ensuring that workers‟ rights 
are indeed respected. The 2007 report also mentions Ford‟s extensive work with preventing 
HIV/AIDS in its workplace. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between the ways that 
the two firms ensure accountability towards, and respect of, their international workforce.  
 
Ford has been forced to concede to several policies that are antithetical to its usual LME 
approach; specifically industry-wide bargaining. However, it has been able to retain several 
of its own processes, such as „top down‟ management style and placing the responsibility of 
training on employees. Furthermore, it has retained an adversarial approach to its unions, as 
indicated by actions such as unilaterally making decisions whilst supposedly in consultation 
with NUMSA. It also showed less commitment to job security during the recent recession. 
Lastly, it has limited safeguards in place to protect workers, outside of those that exist 
because of the institutional environment in South Africa, i.e. high unionisation rates. Indeed, 
the NBF and the strength of NUMSA was considered by Ford to be reason enough to assume 
that working conditions in South Africa were up to standard. It has therefore showed much 
less involvement in monitoring labour relations. Overall, Ford has adapted to certain local 
conditions, whilst maintaining a general LME approach.  
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Table. 5.2 Ford in South Africa 
 In America  In South Africa  
Business-Labour 
Relations 
Mutually Adversarial 
Relations With Unions 
Mutually Adversarial Relations 
With Unions 
Negotiations Nationally with UAW as a 
Firm, with some Plant 
Specific Negotiations as well.  
Industry-wide Collective 
Bargaining Through the NBF 
Unions and Employer 
Groups 
Negotiates with UAW.  Member of NAAMSA and the 
AMEO 
Shareholder Versus 
Stakeholder Value 
Shareholders Primary   Low Involvement in the Local 
Economy. Runs Some CSR 
Initiatives, Primarily 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and 
Education. Weak Oversight of 
Factories and Suppliers. 
Job Security Job Security Through 
Negotiations with UAW, 
However many 
Retrenchments over the last 4 
years.   
Low Commitment to Job 
Security During the Recent 
Recession 
Productivity The Cost and Flexibility of 
Labour Stressed.  
Education Neglected, Despite 
Local Skill Shortages 
Hierarchy „Top Down‟.  „Top Down‟ 
 
Findings  
 
First it should be clear that both Ford and Volkswagen had to adapt their respective 
approaches to the labour conditions that existed in South Africa. In the instance of Ford, this 
required engaging in industry-wide negotiations, which in turn resulted in more „rigid‟ 
arrangements and greater employee influence than would usually be conceded by the firm. 
In the case of Volkswagen, this has required dealing with militant unions and adversarial 
industrial relations, significantly weakening the company‟s codetermination agenda. 
However, despite these obstacles, Volkswagen has nevertheless pursued this agenda in 
South Africa. This has also applied to its suppliers as well.  
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Table 5.3 Volkswagen and Ford in South Africa Compared  
 Volkswagen Ford 
Business-Labour 
Relations 
Attempted Cooperation With 
Adversarial Unions  
Mutually Adversarial Relations 
With Unions 
Negotiations Industry-wide Collective 
Bargaining Through the 
NBF 
Industry-wide Collective 
Bargaining Through the NBF 
Unions and Employer 
Groups 
Member of NAAMSA and 
the AMEO; Cooperates with 
the State in Pursing Strategic 
Goals 
Member of NAAMSA and the 
AMEO 
Shareholder Versus 
Stakeholder Value 
Heavily Invested In Local 
Economy. Runs Numerous 
CSR Initiatives, Including 
HIV/AIDS and Education 
Programs 
Has Lower Involvement in the 
Local Economy. Runs Some 
CSR Initiatives, Primarily 
HIV/AIDS Prevention.  
Job Security Greater Commitment to Job 
Security During the Recent 
Recession  
Lower Commitment to Job 
Security During the Recent 
Recession 
Productivity Emphasis on Training and 
Education  
Education Neglected, Despite 
Local Skill Shortages 
Hierarchy Employee Representation 
Mandated by the „Global 
Labour Charter‟. Employees 
Present on the Joint Union-
Management Executive 
Committee 
„Top Down‟ 
 
Overall, Volkswagen has been much more involved in the broader economy. It has 
cooperated with local governments, as well as the Department of Labour, on several key 
initiatives. It has sought to steer local developments to be conductive of its strategic vision, 
in consultation with the state. This has involved a lot of give and take between the firm and 
various levels of government. The NMBLP is just one product of this relationship; the 
company‟s range of education initiatives are others. Volkswagen has also exhibited a greater 
willingness to invest in the future longevity of auto industry in South Africa through 
ambitious local content targets. These targets also, however, represent important strategic 
benchmarks for the company‟s export growth. Overall, Volkswagen has pursued 
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codetermination, even to the detriment of its commercial interest, as is the case with the 
2000 strike. Despite the significant threats posed by low trust and militant unions, some 
adaptation of the CME model is still clearly present.  
 
Ford on the other hand has remained more distant from the industry as a whole. It does not 
have the sort of relationship with the government that Volkswagen has, nor has it shown the 
same level of commitment or interest in education and training, nurturing local suppliers, 
and employee job security. It has retained its strict managerial style despite the more CME-
style industry-wide labour environment. Furthermore, it has appeared to take less interest in 
assessing and monitoring its South African operations and what limited work has been done 
is this area has excluded employee input. Overall, despite some considerable concessions in 
signing up to the voluntary NBF, Ford still pursues labour relations more consistent to the 
LME model when compared with Volkswagen.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has established the both Ford and Volkswagen have retained their respective 
strategies with regard to industrial relations in their South African operations. These are 
consistent with not only their behaviour in their home states, but also with the LME and CME 
models. Both firms have, however, had to make some concessions to adapt to local 
circumstances. In the case of Ford, this has meant signing up to industry-wide, often rigid 
contracts. In the case of Volkswagen, this has meant dealing with militant and adversarial 
unions. The findings thus indicate the national identity of firms is important in determining 
their behaviour when operating in foreign environments, in spite of supposed pressures 
calling for convergence.   
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Conclusion  
 
The research conducted by this thesis has indicated that the national identity of Ford and 
Volkswagen continue to have an impact on their strategies and behaviours when they are 
operating in a foreign institutional environment. Path dependency thus appears to outweigh 
any converging affects these foreign environments may have. This is directly opposed to 
arguments that in an era of „global‟ competition and capital mobility, firms will be unable to 
sustain such differences. In Chapter Three the thesis argued that the industrial relations of 
these two firms were consistent with those expected under the VoC approach; that is 
codetermination and market based strategies. It is the presence of these strategies in the South 
African export zones that has led to the above conclusions. This is particularly telling, as 
EPZ‟s in a developing country such as South Africa are precisely the institutional 
environment in which the „pressures of globalisation‟ are often expected to be most prevalent.  
 
However, in Chapter Four, it was argued that EPZ‟s are not the „same places‟ of 
neoliberalism they are often seen as, but are instead the products of the environments of the 
countries they are in, and what strategies are being pursued by those counties. In the case of 
South Africa, this actually meant considerable government involvement in the zones, 
providing infrastructure and other services. The state was also unable to quell the power of 
the unions in these zones. The result was, in the case of Ford, strong movement towards more 
codetermination-like arrangements, such as industry-wide collective bargaining. Volkswagen, 
too, has struggle with certain conditions in South Africa -specifically militant unionism- 
which has made its usual strategies less affective. However, while there has been some 
divergence from the CME and LME models, these have by no means seen wide-scale 
convergence by the two firms along one strategy; least of all a purely neoliberal strategy.  
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However there are some limitations associated with this study; notably, that this case study 
examined only two very similar firms in two very similar foreign environments. Firstly, it 
may be that case that the above results were more a result of South Africa‟s institutional 
environment, not the path dependency of the firms. To address this, future studies could 
examine firms across all of the EPZ‟s they operate in, or across all their factories throughout 
the developing world. Secondly, the automotive industry is highly technical, and requires 
strict quality controls. Other industries, such as textiles, can rely on low-cost unskilled labour 
to produce adequate quality products, while defects in products are considerably less costly. 
Therefore, the path dependency of Ford and Volkswagen may have more to do with the 
industry they are in. To address this, future studies can take larger samples, utilising a more 
quantitative approach involving numerous firms across several industries. Finally, wide 
generalisation about the nature of „American‟ and „German‟ strategies cannot be made from 
such a small sample. The above quantitative approach would also address these issues.  
 
However, despite these real limitations, the research conducted in this thesis has yielded 
conclusive results as to the path dependency of MNC‟s when operating in foreign 
institutional environments in the area of industrial relations. This path dependency exists in 
spite of claims that globalisation and its demands, specifically on the global south and its 
EPZ‟s, will necessitate convergence.   
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Appendix- Coding Results 
Codetermination 
 
 VW AR Ford AR VW CoC For CoC VW Total Ford Total
Codetermination 57 10 32 21 89 31
Quality 6 0 1 0 7 0
     Quality 1 0 1 0 2 0
     Innovation 2 0 0 0 2 0
     Standardisation 3 0 0 0 3 0
Supporting Employees 12 2 3 0 15 2
     Supporting Employees 6 0 2 0 8 0
     Employee Personal Development 2 0 0 0 2 0
     Employee Satisfaction 1 0 1 0 2 0
     Job Security 3 2 0 0 3 2
Coordinating With Employees 14 8 9 7 23 15
     Coordinating With Employees 4 0 7 0 11 0
     Autonomy of labour 0 0 1 0 1 0
     Mutual Interests and Obligation 3 0 0 0 3 0
     Value of Employees to Business Success 0 0 0 3 0 3
     Relationships 5 0 0 3 5 3
     Unions 2 8 1 1 3 9
0 0
Training 25 0 1 0 26 0
     Training 17 0 1 0 18 0
     Recruitment 3 0 0 0 3 0
     Expertise 5 0 0 0 5 0
Rules Laws and Regulations 0 0 18 14 18 14
     Rules Laws and Regulations 0 0 14 12 14 12
     Internal Accountability 0 0 4 2 4 2
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Market Forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VW AR Ford AR VW CoC Ford CoC VW Total Ford Total
Market Forces 2 13 4 8 6 21
0 0
Industrial Action 0 1 0 0 0 1
Productivity 0 3 0 0 0 3
     Productivity 0 1 0 0 0 1
     Flexibility 0 2 0 0 0 2
Shareholders 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0
Business Performance 2 4 2 3 4 7
     Business Performance 0 0 1 2 1 2
     Risk Management 0 0 1 1 1 1
     Financial Obligations and HR Costs 2 4 0 0 2 4
Market Conditions 0 5 1 5 1 10
     Market Conditions 0 0 1 3 1 3
     Competition 0 5 0 2 0 7
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Social Concerns 
 
 
 
Total Codes 
 
 VW AR Ford AR VW CoC For CoC VW Total Ford Total
Social Concerns 4 0 8 12 12 12
Gender Equity 1 0 0 0 1 0
Community 1 0 1 0 2 0
Company Values 1 0 2 4 3 4
Stakeholders 1 0 3 3 4 3
Reputation 0 0 2 5 2 5
Codetermination Market Forces Social Concerns
Ford 31 21 12
Of which is Code of Conduct 21 8 12
Of which is the Annual Report 10 13 0
Volkswagen 89 6 12
Of which is Code of Conduct 32 4 8
Of which is the Annual Report 57 2 4
Total 120 27 24
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